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ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF NECESSITY
IN THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Robert D. Sloane*
Necessity, necessità, is Machiavelli’s guiding principle . . . that infringing the moral law is justified when it is necessary.
Thus is inaugurated the dualism of modern political culture, which simultaneously upholds
absolute and relative standards of value. The modern state appeals to morality, to religion, and
to natural law as the ideological foundation for its existence. At the same time it is prepared
to infringe any or all of these in the interest of self-preservation.
—J. M. Coetzee1

Recent jurisprudence in investment arbitration, almost all of which originated in disputes
arising out of Argentina’s turn-of-the-century fiscal crisis, has raised difficult questions about
the existence, nature, and advisability of necessity as a defense to state responsibility. The jurisprudence has contributed to a sophisticated literature focusing on necessity’s role in the special
context of investment arbitration. But the growing prominence of necessity pleas in international law has not been so limited. Nor will its effects be. In the first place, investor-state arbitral
jurisprudence contributes to the evolution of general international law.2 Investment tribunals
invoke the latter, for example, to inform their interpretation of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) or to cure lacunae in the law.3 More significantly, beyond the realm of investment arbitration, the past few decades have seen a striking growth in necessity pleas in fields ranging
widely across the landscape of international law.
As an arguable defense to state responsibility, necessity has been raised by states or analyzed
sua sponte by tribunals in, among other contexts, the following:
●

humanitarian intervention in violation of an orthodox reading of the UN Charter;4

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1
DIARY OF A BAD YEAR 17 (2007).
2
The phrase general international law is not used consistently. I mean the full corpus of international law that
does not depend on treaty regimes or other special legal norms.
3
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Art.
42(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 UST 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
4
For analysis, see infra notes 350 – 66 and accompanying text. See generally Ian Johnstone, The Plea of “Necessity”
in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
337 (2005); Ole Spierman, Humanitarian Intervention as a Necessity and the Threat or Use of Jus Cogens, 71 NORDIC
J. INT’L L. 523 (2002); cf. Andreas Laursen, The Use of Force and (the State of ) Necessity, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 485 (2004).
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●

violation of the jus ad bellum by Israel’s construction of a security barrier or wall in the
West Bank;5

●

a hypothetical breach of the jus in bello by “the threat or use of nuclear weapons”
in what the International Court of Justice (ICJ) characterized as “an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake;”6

●

breaches of the arbitral award settling the Rainbow Warrior affair;7

●

international trade disputes;8

●

seizure of foreign vessels in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;9

●

a conceptual justification for the doctrine of preventive war;10

●

closing borders to refugees in circumstances that might violate the customary principle
of non-refoulement;11 and

●

suggestions by European states that they might justifiably suspend the Schengen
regime because of the influx of refugees from Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere following
the “Arab Spring.”12

The meaning of necessity, like many legal terms of art, differs “greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”13 We must take care not to
equate distinct legal concepts merely because they share a name.14 But mindful of that qualification, the growing prevalence of necessity in international law may be ascribed, in part, to
two factors. The first is the widespread perception of an imminent crisis or risk, a common
denominator of necessity. Recently, the number, nature, and scope of potentially catastrophic,
or even existential, threats have increased. They include potential terrorist strikes at or surpassing the scale of the September 11, 2001, attacks; the possibility that a “rogue state” might
5
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 ICJ REP. 136, para. 140 ( July 9).
6
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226, para. 105 ( July 8)
(emphasis added).
7
See Rainbow Warrior (N.Z./Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 254 – 63 (Arb. Trib. 1990).
8
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, W T/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010).
9
See, e.g., The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 1999 ITLOS REP. 10, paras.
132–36 ( July 1), 38 ILM 1323(1999); see also UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 92(1), opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397.
10
See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 17, 2002), at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; see also MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND
THE LAW OF WAR 40 – 41 (2009).
11
See generally Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2000).
12
See, e.g., Ian Traynor & John Hooper, France and Italy in Call to Close EU Borders in Wake of Arab Protests,
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 26, 2011, at 1; Judy Dempsey, Denmark Reintroduces Border Controls, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13iht-border13.html.
13
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
14
Necessity has also been analyzed, for example, as a potential defense to international criminal responsibility.
See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193 (2010); Gabriella Blum, The Laws of
War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2010); Christopher P. DeNicola, Comment, A Shield for the
“Knights of Humanity”: The ICC Should Adopt a Humanitarian Necessity Defense to the Crime of Aggression, 30 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 641 (2008).
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develop nuclear weapons or transfer them to a nonstate actor;15 severe fiscal crises of a degree
last seen during the Great Depression;16 global warming;17 and pandemics.18
A second, more prosaic factor, which may nonetheless sometimes interact with the first—as
it did in the context of Argentina’s fiscal crisis— concerns the Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility) by the International
Law Commission (ILC).19 Article 25 provides:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless
the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril; and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking
necessity; or
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.20
Necessity, so defined, is one of seven circumstances precluding wrongfulness (CPWs) enumerated in the Articles on State Responsibility.21 Absent a lex specialis,22 Article 25 offers, in the
lexicon of the articles, a uniformly applicable “secondary rule,” which may preclude the wrongfulness of state conduct that might otherwise breach a “primary rule.” In brief, primary rules
govern “the content and the duration of substantive State obligations,” whereas secondary rules
15

See, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/
2011/69 (Nov. 18, 2011); cf. W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AJIL 82, 86
(2003).
16
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 707, 707 (2010); Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 1, 2009, at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid⫽newsarchive&sid⫽aNivTjr
852TI.
17
Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/15 ( July 20, 2011).
18
Denise Grady & Donald G. McNeil Jr., Debate Persists on Deadly Flu Made Airborne, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2011, at A1.
19
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility], reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 61 (2002) [hereinafter ILC COMMENTARY]. The Lauterpacht Centre for International Law of the University of Cambridge maintains what it characterizes as an “almost complete collection of all the relevant historical
documents relating to the International Law Commission’s State Responsibility work from 1996 to 2001.” The
collection is available online at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/projects/state_responsibility_document_collection.
php#6. All of the ILC documents are also available online on the Commission’s website, http://www.un.org/law/
ilc/.
20
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25.
21
Id., Arts. 21–27.
22
Id., Art. 55.
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establish a uniform (and conceptually and temporally subsequent) framework setting forth
“the consequences of a breach of an applicable primary obligation.”23
Because of the predominance of treaty norms in investment arbitration, most awards to date
have focused on how the presumed customary defense codified in Article 25 should apply in
this special context. Few awards, if any, have raised the logically antecedent question whether Article
25 actually codifies custom. Like the ICJ,24 investor-state tribunals have assumed that it does.25 The
virtually exclusive focus on necessity in the investment context has tended to eclipse more general or theoretical questions about Article 25’s positive legal status and, normatively, the propriety, prudence, and appeal of necessity, so defined, in contemporary international law.
These broad inquiries raise a number of questions. In terms of the ILC’s formal mandate,
does Article 25 codify custom, as the ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
and investment tribunals have opined, or would it more accurately be characterized as “progressive development”?26 If the latter, as I argue below, in what way is Article 25 progressive?
Necessity, after all, is notoriously subject to abuse,27 although that does not by itself, of course,
counsel against its legal recognition.28 But might not Article 25—if it is grafted on, or sequentially applied to, analyses of primary rules of necessity— effectively give the invoking state “two
bites at the apple” of necessity? And mindful of the vital role that effective legal institutions (for
example, legislatures and courts) serve in regulating necessity in national law, would a comparable defense be feasible, constructive, and prudent in a legal system that lacks reliable analogues to these institutions?29
This essay attempts, at a minimum, to identify and clarify the nature of the questions that
should be asked about Article 25’s conception of necessity, and it also ventures tentative
answers to, or at least reflections upon, some the most significant of these questions. It also
sounds some cautionary notes about the idea of a general necessity defense as a secondary rule,
drawing attention to the conceptual, institutional, and other potential issues that Article 25
might raise in practice. These issues can be obscured by the veneer of a multilateral treaty that
the Articles on State Responsibility tend to enjoy.30
23
James Crawford, Introduction, in ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 1, 15–16. For analysis, see infra notes
350 –366 and accompanying text.
24
See Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 ICJ REP. 7, paras. 51–52 (Sept. 25); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 5, para. 140.
25
See Jürgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 334 –35 (2010); see, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, para. 344 (Sept. 28, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/8, Award, para. 315 (May 12, 2005).
26
See UN Charter Art. 13(1); GA Res. 174 (II), at 105 (Nov. 21, 1947); Donald McRae, The Work of the International Law Commission, 2007–2011: Progress and Prospects, 106 AJIL 322, 324 –31 (2012).
27
See Sarah Heathcote, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Necessity,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 491, 492 ( James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson
eds., 2010); see also Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT’L
L. COMM’N, pt. 1, at 13, paras. 71–76, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318/Adds.5–7 [hereinafter Eighth Report Addendum];
ILC yearbooks are available online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/yearbooks.htm.
28
Glanville Williams, The Defence of Necessity, 6 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 216, 225 (1953); see also OSIEL, supra
note 10, at 37.
29
For further explanation and analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 229 –36.
30
See generally David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between
Form and Authority, 96 AJIL 857 (2002).
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To be clear from the outset, this essay does not focus on the many and diverse conceptions
of necessity or cognate principles—at the level of primary rules—that permeate contemporary
international law. Within particular fields or regimes in which necessity is clearly defined,
intended to serve a clear purpose, and subjected to control by effective institutions,31 necessity
can play valuable, even indispensable, roles. International trade law is one strong case in
point.32 In situations of this sort, however, necessity operates as a primary rule in a particular
field, and its role is limited by, inter alia, its context; it does not operate as a generally applicable
and uniform secondary rule of state responsibility. Neither the existence nor the normative
appeal of such a secondary rule in contemporary international law is clear. And insofar as Article
25 resembles the choice-of-evils paradigm of necessity found in national law—that is, that an
otherwise unlawful action may be justified as the lesser of two acknowledged harms or evils—its
development of international law may be more problematic than progressive.
I suggest by way of conclusion that necessity be reoriented to facilitate and incentivize a more
transparent appraisal of the competing interests, policies, and values that will virtually always
be at stake, at least implicitly, in those international disputes in which necessity is pleaded. The
lodestar of the inquiry should not be the once paramount axiom of the law of nations that states
enjoy a natural right to preserve their very existence. In contemporary international law, the
plea of necessity instead requires a contextual inquiry into, and candid consideration of, the
unavoidable trade-offs among the often incommensurable interests, policies, and values
embedded in international law; and the lodestar of the inquiry today should be the reorientation of international law after World War II toward promoting human dignity and welfare—
perhaps through states, but not for states (qua states).33
I. IS NECESSITY (ALREADY) INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM?
Construing the Articles on State Responsibility
Because the Articles on State Responsibility blend codification and progressive development, it can be “difficult to say which article partakes more of one or the other.”34 The ILC
decided not to request that the General Assembly promulgate the Articles on State Responsibility as the framework for an immediate multilateral treaty because certain articles proved
controversial and were deemed unlikely to attract sufficient consensus.35 The Commission
31

On the vital role of control systems generally and in international law and dispute resolution in particular, see
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION
1–10 (1992).
32
Others may include, for example, the jus ad bellum obligation that all force be necessary, the jus in bello obligation limiting force to no more than necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, treaties of all sorts authorizing temporary derogation based on various exigent circumstances, and international human rights treaties that
allow states to derogate from certain obligations “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
33
See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AJIL 866, 872
(1990).
34
Caron, supra note 30, at 873.
35
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fiftieth Session, UN GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp.
No. 10, para. 224, UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998) [hereinafter Fiftieth Session Report].
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concluded that “a suitable period for reflection” would be more prudent than a draft convention and, indeed, that it might better facilitate “the possible conversion of the articles into a
convention, if this is thought appropriate and feasible.”36 At the ILC’s request,37 the General
Assembly therefore took the modest step of “commend[ing] [the Articles on State Responsibility] to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action.”38
But as David Caron argued shortly thereafter in a symposium on the Articles on State
Responsibility in this Journal, the ILC’s choice of form has its own perils.39 As summarized by
the symposium editors, the
seductive clarity, seeming concreteness, and treatylike form [of the Articles on State
Responsibility], together with the paucity of other sources on some important issues, may
tempt decision makers to apply the articles verbatim, rather than treat them only as evidence of the relevant international rule. Caron cautions decision makers not to give the
articles such unwarranted authority, and urges them to scrutinize the articles rigorously,
together with all of their associated context and history, in weighing whether the ILC offers
the right result.40
This admonition is sound both generally and relative to Article 25 in particular.41 The Articles on State Responsibility offer tribunals and other decision makers formulaic, textual, and
facially authoritative answers to some of the thorniest issues in the law of state responsibility.
Many of these issues, however—necessity included—proved controversial during the drafting
of the Articles on State Responsibility and, despite their publication, remain so.42 A combination of the general esteem in which the ILC is held, the succession of eminent special rapporteurs on state responsibility, and the sheer amount of time that preceded the Articles on
State Responsibility’s publication (nearly half a century) confers a veneer of authority on the
text as a whole, which some provisions may not merit. Nonetheless, tribunals have tended to
treat the Articles on State Responsibility as though they reflect uncontroversial international
custom or a widely ratified multilateral treaty. This approach to the articles is—not invariably,
but also not infrequently—misguided. Article 25 is a case in point.
Four years before the Articles on State Responsibility’s publication, the ICJ said that necessity—as defined in an earlier, substantially similar draft of what would become Article 25—is
“a ground recognized by customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act
36
Crawford, supra note 23, at 59 (emphasis added). I respectfully disagree with the suggestion that post-2001
developments vindicate the ILC’s prescriptive hope in this regard. Rather than analyze Article 25 “rigorously,
together with all of [its] associated context and history,” Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC’s
State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview, 96 AJIL 773, 775 (2002), most tribunals and scholars have
adopted Article 25 without analysis or reflection. See Caron, supra note 30, at 858, 868 –70.
37
Crawford, supra note 23, at 59; see also GA Res. 56/83, pmbl. ( Jan. 28, 2002).
38
GA Res. 56/83, supra note 37, para. 3.
39
Caron, supra note 30, at 868 –70.
40
Bodansky & Crook, supra note 36, at 775; see also Caron, supra note 30, at 858.
41
See also Kürtz, supra note 25, at 335.
42
See, e.g., James Crawford, Addendum to Second Report on State Responsibility, paras. 278, 282, UN Doc.
A.CN.4/498/Add.2, (Apr. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Second Report Addendum]; Crawford, supra note 23, at 4 &
n.20; Heathcote, supra note 27, at 491–92; Comments and Observations of Governments on Part I of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [1982] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, pt. 1, at 15,
17–20, UN Doc. A/CN.4/351 & Adds. 1–3; see also Caron, supra note 30, at 858.
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not in conformity with an international obligation.”43 The ICJ cited no authority for this statement other than ILC draft Article 33, which, as revised, became Article 25. Nor did the ICJ
analyze relevant state practice and opinio juris in an effort to validate draft Article 33’s purported customary status in accordance with its traditional methodology for ascertaining custom. Four years later, the ILC, in turn, relied on the presumptive authority of the ICJ’s naked
assertion in Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project to bolster Article 25.44 Three years later, the ICJ
applied Article 25, which it again, without analysis, treated as custom.45
This institutional circularity is troubling. It is not clear that ILC members uniformly
regarded Article 25 as codification. In draft, the article prompted significant debate, and the
ILC Commentary on its status is ambiguous. The commentary first remarks that in a handful
of cases and incidents, “the plea of necessity has been accepted in principle, or at least not rejected”46— hardly a robust affirmation of Article 25’s status as international custom. But after canvassing those cases and incidents, the ILC concludes that “[o]n balance, State practice and judicial decisions support the view that necessity may constitute a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness under certain very limited conditions, and this view is embodied in article 25.”47
A Critique of the ILC Commentary to Article 25
Of course, fierce debates continue about customary international law.48 Whether Article 25
codifies custom— or perhaps a general principle of law within the meaning of the ICJ Statute,
as Bin Cheng has suggested49—might depend on one’s view of how custom should be ascertained. But for present purposes, these perennial methodological debates can and should be
elided. First, whether one treats the putative authorities as state practice, evidence of opinio
juris, trends in decision, indicia of “the core notion of expectations,”50 or something else, scrutiny of the authorities casts at least some doubt on the prevailing assumption that Article 25
codifies custom. Second, most international lawyers embrace some form of legal positivism.
Both the ICJ and, perhaps to a lesser degree in view of its “progressive development” mandate,
the ILC adopt the orthodox definition of custom as a consistent, widespread, and (often) longstanding state practice that states follow out of a sense of legal obligation, opinio juris sive necessitatis. Third, this essay is not the place for what would necessarily be a long digression into the
morass of academic literature on custom. It aspires only to provide a critical appraisal of the
authorities said to support the view that Article 25 codifies custom, and then to consider Article
25’s potential practical effects and normative dimensions.
43

Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 24, para. 51.
ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 181– 82, cmt. 11.
45
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 5, para.
140.
46
ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 3.
47
Id. at 183, cmt. 14; see also Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495 (suggesting that except for the phrase in Article
25(1)(b) privileging interests of “the international community as a whole,” which “is considered progressive development,” Article 25 codifies custom).
48
See generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law:
A Reconciliation, 95 AJIL 757 (2001).
49
BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
69 –77 (1953); see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, Art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055, TS No.
993.
50
W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 ASIL PROC. 101, 103 (1981).
44
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The cases and incidents in the ILC Commentary to Article 25 fall into roughly three categories. These correspond, by and large, to three factual rubrics: state security, fiscal crises, and
ecological harms. They will be explored seriatim, but at the outset it may be helpful to supply
a general conceptual framework that sets out the basic contours of each paradigm of necessity
that may be discerned in the authorities in question. I will refer to the first of these paradigms
as classical necessity. Without exception, precedents in this rubric involve alleged threats to state
security, often framed in terms of a state’s natural right to self-preservation. Indeed, it is telling
to note that before the recent arbitral awards arising (in all but one case)51 out of Argentina’s
fiscal crisis, necessity had never been sustained on the merits in a context other than state selfpreservation. I will refer to the second rubric as economic necessity (or force majeure). These cases
and incidents generally involve the awkward conflation of necessity and force majeure. International tribunals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries failed to distinguish the
two defenses clearly, which has led to some confusion in the jurisprudence from that era. The
Articles on State Responsibility, by contrast, appropriately distinguish force majeure (Article
23) and necessity (Article 25). I will refer to the final rubric as ecological necessity. These precedents frequently seem to involve the questionable identification of an official’s use of the word
necessity (or a similar term) with a legal claim to that effect.
A fourth category of precedents could be adduced from (probably hundreds of ) treaties that
include provisions for derogation or limitation based on exigent circumstances. But these treaties would be irrelevant to the present inquiry. Again, the question is not whether diverse primary-rule conceptions of necessity exist throughout international law. They clearly do and long
have. The question is whether necessity—as a generally applicable, uniform secondary rule,
which offers states a potential defense to responsibility for the violation of primary rules in
almost any field—is general international law, as custom or otherwise. Treaties that prescribe
necessity or a cognate principle as a primary rule do not speak to this issue. (That is presumably
why the ILC Commentary does not refer to this fourth category either.) The analysis that follows therefore focuses only on whether the precedents, including but not limited to those in
the ILC Commentary, establish Article 25 as a general CPW in the law of state responsibility.
Classical (existential) necessity. Early publicists on the law of nations—Hugo Grotius,
Alberico Gentili, Emer de Vattel, and others—agreed that it included necessity.52 But it is
important to understand what they meant by necessity: because the law of nations governed
the rights and duties of juridically equal sovereign states inter se, each state perforce retained
the right to take any action necessary to preserve its existence as a state. No state, that is, could
be expected to obey an international obligation if, in consequence, it would cease to be a legal
subject of the law and community of nations.53
The classical publicists therefore understood necessity to be a natural right of states in much
the way that Thomas Hobbes understood the sole, but inalienable, natural right of men: “the
51
The exception is Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award, para. 106 (Apr. 22, 2009)
(rejecting the defense).
52
See ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 182– 83, cmt. 13 & n.420; see also Eighth Report Addendum, supra
note 27, para. 71.
53
See, e.g., 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 434 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005) (1625); EMER
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. ix, §120 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas
Nugent trans., 2008) (1758).
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liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own
nature.”54 Vattel drew an analogy in this regard:
The earth was designed to feed its inhabitants; and he who is in want of every thing is
not obliged to starve because all property is vested in others. When, therefore, a nation is
in absolute want of provisions, she may compel her neighbours, who have more than they
want for themselves, to supply her with a fair share of them at a fair price: she may even
take it by force, if they will not sell.55
For Vattel and many other early publicists, it would have been implausible to think that the
law of nations, a legal system predicated on the interaction of juridically equal states, denied
states the right to preserve themselves.
Whether these publicists understood necessity as a justification or an excuse is unclear, in
all likelihood because this distinction, though routinely drawn today, is a comparatively modern legal development. Grotius wrote, “For if I cannot defend myself without intercepting
those Things that are sent to my Enemy, Necessity . . . will give me a good Right to them, but
upon Condition of Restitution, unless I have just Cause to the contrary.”56 Vattel argued that
necessity authorized a state to compel the sale of (or, if the seller refused to sell, to seize forcibly)
“ships, wagons, horses, or even the personal labour of foreigners . . . . But as [the state] has no
more right to these things than necessity gives her, she ought to pay for the use she makes of
them, if she has the means of paying.”57 This obligation to compensate suggests that necessity
excuses rather than justifies, for if it justified—that is, precluded the wrongfulness of the
act—no international wrong would exist to repair. But Vattel, among others, could be ambiguous in this regard. Elsewhere in his treatise, he wrote that necessity renders lawful what would
otherwise be an unlawful act,58 implying that necessity indeed precludes wrongfulness (and
therefore justifies rather than excuses).
It may well be anachronistic to apply the excuse/justification distinction to the concept of
necessity found in the writings of these classical publicists. I mention it here because it anticipates an inadequately theorized dimension of Article 25 to which I will return below—
namely, whether necessity should excuse or justify, and why. What is clear from the early treatises, however, is that, as a defense to state responsibility, necessity originated in the natural
right of a state to preserve itself. This idea appears not only in classical treatises on the law of
nations but, as we will see, in the vast majority of the authorities that the ILC Commentary
invokes to support Article 25’s more expansive conception of necessity. With due and sincere
respect, the authorities do not seem to bear out Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago’s emphatic
view that “the concepts of self-preservation and state of necessity are in no way identical, nor
are they indissolubly linked in the sense that one is merely the basis and justification of the
other.”59
54

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651).
VATTEL, supra note 53.
56
3 GROTIUS, supra note 53, at 1190; see also 2 GROTIUS, supra note 53, at 434.
57
VATTEL, supra note 53.
58
Id., §119.
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Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 8 (citation omitted).
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Recorded state practice evincing the classical conception of necessity is limited to a few nineteenth-century incidents. In the 1829 Chichester affair, Britain had objected to Mexico’s detention of its vessel pursuant to an embargo that Mexico declared in anticipation of a Spanish
attack and in order “to prevent information from reaching the Spanish squadron.”60 Herbert
Jenner, the advocate general, advised the Crown that necessity authorized Mexico’s temporary
seizure of the vessel. Echoing Vattel, he wrote, “The first and paramount duty of every Nation
is that of self-preservation, and the Law of Nations will sanction the adoption of any measure,
which may be necessary to secure this great object, although it may in some degree infringe
upon the rights of others.”61
The same rationale for necessity emerges in the two early nineteenth-century incidents cited
in the ILC Commentary: the 1832 Anglo-Portuguese dispute and The Caroline.62 In the former, Portugal agreed by treaty to respect the property of British nationals residing there.63 But
faced with an insurgency and the “necessity of providing for the subsistence of certain contingents of troops engaged in quelling internal disturbances,”64 it appropriated British property.
The British consul general in Lisbon notified the Crown that “under the plea of necessity, the
Viscount de Santarem claims the right of appropriating British Property, to the use of the Portuguese Government.”65 Jenner again advised the Crown that in the interest of self-preservation,
Portugal could temporarily violate Britain’s treaty rights insofar as strictly necessary.66 Relying
on Vattel,67 he said that Portugal’s observance of the treaty, although ordinarily subject to the
principle pacta sunt servanda, could be suspended, or observed less strictly, so as not “to deprive
. . . Portugal of the right of using those means, which may be absolutely and indispensably necessary to the safety, and even to the very existence of the State.”68 The italicized phrase reinforces
both the existential rationale for necessity and the stringency of the threshold for its invocation
in the classical law of nations.
The ILC Commentary next turns to The Caroline.69 In 1837, New York citizens sympathetic to a Canadian insurrection had been using the Caroline, a U.S. vessel, to aid the insurgents. A British regiment crossed the border into New York, boarded the vessel, set it ablaze,
and let it drift downstream to its destruction on the Niagara Falls, injuring and killing several
U.S. citizens.70 Secretary of State Daniel Webster protested with characteristic eloquence: “It
will be for [the British] Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation . . . . [T]he act justified by the
60

2 ARNOLD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 231 (1956).
Id.
62
ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 179, cmts. 4 –5.
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Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 23.
64
ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 4.
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2 MCNAIR, supra note 60, at 231–32 (footnote omitted).
66
Id.
67
See id. (citing VATTEL, supra note 53, ch. xii, §170).
68
Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
69
ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 5.
70
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 248 (4th ed. 2005). See generally John E.
Noyes, The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 263 ( John
E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007); R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32
AJIL 82, 82– 89 (1938).
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necessity of self-defence . . . must be limited by that necessity . . . .”71 Based on Webster’s references to self-defense, The Caroline is often cited as a precedent for anticipatory self-defense
or the necessity component of the postwar jus ad bellum.72 This reliance seems misplaced. At
the time, which coincided with the high-water mark of positivism in international law, no jus
ad bellum existed.73 It therefore would have been odd for Webster to insist on a legal threshold
for recourse to force, defensive or otherwise.74
The ILC Commentary more accurately frames the issue presented by The Caroline:75 did
“the necessity of self-defence and self-preservation”76 authorize Britain to encroach upon and
to damage or injure the territory, property, and people of the United States?77 The two states
ultimately agreed upon the legal principles at stake and resolved their dispute by effectively
“agreeing to disagree” about whether Britain’s conduct conformed to those principles. Yet as
a precedent for necessity, the critical question concerns the nature and scope of their agreement
on the antecedent legal principles. In this regard, The Caroline, like the Chichester and AngloPortuguese disputes, supports only the classical view that necessity may temporarily excuse one
state’s failure to observe an international legal obligation (here, respect for another state’s sovereignty) in circumstances of war or a comparably serious security threat to the invoking state.78
The earliest precedents cited in the ILC Commentary thus reflect the classical conception
of necessity found in Grotius, Vattel, and other early publicists. Each involved a literal security
threat to the invoking state. One may certainly question, as did Andrew Stevenson, the U.S.
minister to Great Britain during the Caroline incident, whether these threats could reasonably
be said to imperil the “very existence” of the invoking states.79 But the accuracy of those factual
judgments is beside the point. The early authorities, including the classical publicists and the
incidents cited in the ILC Commentary, consistently establish the threshold for necessity at the
level of a security threat and not merely, to quote Article 25, an “essential interest”—a more
open-textured phrase that may lend itself to a more capacious and protean standard in practice.
Another difference between the classical conception of necessity and that of Article 25 is that
the latter requires that the act in question not “seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”
Neither the early publicists nor anything in the incidents cited in the ILC Commentary suggests that the determination of necessity requires that one weigh the “grave and imminent
71
Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox, British Minister to Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in 2
MCNAIR, supra note 60, at 222.
72
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634 –35 (1984);
see also MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1131 & n.63 (6th ed. 2008) (collecting authorities).
73
See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 67; 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
114 –15 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Arnold D. McNair, Collective Security, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
150, 150 –52.
74
Furthermore, “There was nothing anticipatory about the British action against the Caroline . . . , inasmuch as
use of the Caroline for transporting men and materials across the Niagara River . . . had already been in progress.”
DINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 184 – 85.
75
ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 179, cmt. 5.
76
Noyes, supra note 70, at 270.
77
See 2 MCNAIR, supra note 60, at 222–23; DINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 185.
78
Britain’s diplomatic correspondence, which concluded the affair, characterized the competing legal interests
as, on the one hand, “[r]espect for the inviolable character of [sovereign] territory,” and on the other, “a strong overpowering necessity.” NOYES, supra note 70, at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79
See id. at 270.
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peril” to the invoking state’s interests against the nature or degree of “impair[ment]” to the
interests “of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole,” and as noted in the ILC Commentary, the “interest [of the acting State]
relied on must outweigh all other considerations, not merely from the point of view of the acting State but on a reasonable assessment of the competing interests, whether these are individual or collective.”80 This notion of balancing the essential interests of states against one
another— or against the essential interests of “the international community as a whole”—is
implicit in the structure of Article 25, and in this regard the ILC conception of necessity is redolent of the choice-of-evils paradigm found in the criminal law of some national legal systems.
That paradigm is wholly foreign to necessity as understood in the early law of nations. It would
not have been framed or conceptualized in this way at the time, but if classical necessity applied
in a situation, the invoking state’s right to preserve its existence took precedence over any injury
to another state caused by the former’s violation of international law.
Before turning to the second rubric, economic force majeure, it is worth pausing to consider
why the classical conception of necessity did not embrace a choice-of-evils standard. The
answer, in short, is that it would have been incongruous in the context of roughly contemporaneous political theory, including, in particular, Enlightenment thought positing law as the
product of a literal or figurative social contract arising out of a state of nature.81 Within a legal
system based on social contract, people retained at least one inalienable natural right, the “liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own
nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own
judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”82 Necessity in the
early law of nations may well reflect analogous social contract theory transposed incongruously
to the level of international relations.
As a common heuristic device in international law, national law analogies must always be
scrutinized carefully. Indeed, Article 25’s structural similarity to a choice-of-evils paradigm of
necessity proves troubling in part for this reason. That said, for the limited purpose of clarifying
an important distinction between two conceptions of necessity, consider a hoary example from
Anglo-American law: people stranded in a lifeboat with scarce space and provisions must sacrifice one or more of themselves in order to survive, and so one eventually throws others overboard, or kills and cannibalizes another.83 Either act would, of course, ordinarily be a crime.
But if the perpetrator or perpetrators, after rescue, plead necessity, how should we understand
the defense? Consider two possibilities.
First, perhaps it is meaningless to speak of law under the circumstances. Law presupposes
minimal conditions, and a lifeboat adrift in the middle of an ocean, with inadequate space and
food, and no expectation of rescue, does not meet them. From this perspective, necessity is an
extralegal plea: absent minimal conditions, a “state of nature” revives, and people cannot then
80
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1); ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 184, cmt.
17; see also Second Report Addendum, supra note 42, para. 290 (suggesting that under draft Article 33 “the balance
to be struck” in cases involving erga omnes obligations should differ from the usual “balance between the interests
of the respondent State and the individual interests of the State or States complaining of the breach”).
81
See HOBBES, supra note 54, at 103.
82
Id.
83
Sadly, neither example is hypothetical. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F.Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No.
15,383); R v. Dudley, [1884] Q.B.D. 273.
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be expected to refrain from exercising their natural right to preserve their lives by any means
available to them.
That is not, of course, the only, or even the predominant, conception of necessity. Criminal
acts might instead be defended as the lesser of two evils under certain circumstances. It is better
to kill one to save two than to forbear and let three die. That is the simple consequentialist logic
advanced in the infamous case Regina v. Dudley, in which the court rejected necessity and held
that even such dire circumstances cannot justify homicide.84 But with that one exception,
Anglo-American law generally recognizes the lesser-evils conception of necessity and regards
an ordinarily criminal act that is the lesser of two evils as justifiable.85 So conceived, necessity
is not an extralegal defense. Rather, if it applies under the factual circumstances, the violation
of one law in the service of values underlying or instantiated by another (or by the legal system
as a whole) is justified.86
By analogy, in the early law of nations, if war or a similarly exigent security threat jeopardized
a state’s existence, “the Law of Nations [would] sanction the adoption of any measure, which
may be necessary to secure this great object, although it may in some degree infringe upon the
rights of others.”87 Classical necessity thus resembles the first conception of necessity, whereas
Article 25 resembles the second. The ILC’s definition eschews the existential conception and,
unlike classical necessity, does not limit itself to state self-preservation. Instead, it reconceives
necessity by, first, expanding the scope of state interests that may qualify as “essential” and,
second, subjecting those interests to what is, in effect, a balancing analysis redolent of the choiceof-evils paradigm. This approach may or may not be normatively appealing, but as a descriptive
matter, it finds scant support in the precedents cited in the ILC Commentary. Contrary to Ago’s
view, the precedents indeed suggest, to a certain extent, that “the concepts of [state] self-preservation and state of necessity” are, or were, “linked”; the former is not only one rationale for
the latter but, insofar as the evidence indicates, the overwhelmingly predominant one.88
The predominance of this historical rationale will become clearer from a review of the
remaining authorities in the ILC Commentary. Those authorities also reflect and reinforce the
classical conception of necessity. What differs in the remaining ILC Commentary authorities
is not the conceptual nature of the plea but the factual predicate for its invocation—which
tends to be economic or ecological rather than related to security, strictly speaking. Tellingly,
however, in economic and ecological contexts, as we will see, tribunals and other decision makers, without exception (to the best of my knowledge and research), had never sustained a necessity plea before the 2001 publication of the Articles on State Responsibility. The principled
rejection of a legal concept might, of course, indirectly support, define, or refine the contours
of that concept.89 But that is doubtful in the cases and incidents that the ILC Commentary
84

Regina v. Dudley, [1884] Q.B.D. 273; cf. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, Joint
& Sep. Op. McDonald & Vohrah, JJ. (Oct. 7, 1997).
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See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Ordinarily illegal conduct might also be excused as understandable under the circumstances. But this conception of necessity depends on the nature of the legal subject as a human being (rather than a state). See infra notes
204 –16 and accompanying text.
87
2 MCNAIR, supra note 60, at 231.
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See Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 8 (citation omitted).
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See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, para.
186 ( June 27).
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cites. Those sources consistently reject necessity in terms that cast doubt on Article 25’s structure and that further call into question its presumption that the existing customary international law of state responsibility recognizes necessity as a valid defense in contexts other than
state self-preservation.
Economic necessity. Two paradigms characterize the economic necessity cases: either (1) a
debtor state invokes its fiscal distress to avoid, defer, or modify obligations to a creditor state,
or (2) a state contracts with a private foreign commercial entity and later pleads necessity to
avoid or mitigate its obligations. Before the arbitrations arising out of Argentina’s fiscal crisis,
necessity had never been sustained based on a state’s financial troubles. Even more significantly
(for, as noted, the principled rejection of a legal plea may nonetheless offer legal support for
the existence of that plea), no case or incident before the Argentina cases contemplates a conception of necessity other than the classical one. Time and again, tribunals reject necessity
because, as they observe, the threat to the invoking state does not threaten its very existence as
a state.
The Russian Indemnity award typifies the first economic paradigm (involving debtor and
creditor states).90 In the 1879 treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Russia that ended their
hostilities,91 the empire agreed to indemnify Russia for its war losses.92 In 1894, after a series
of partial payments by the empire, and with much left unpaid, Russia refused to grant the
empire another extension and insisted on immediate repayment of the outstanding balance.93
From 1895 to 1899, however, the Ottoman Empire’s efforts to put down insurgencies in Asia
Minor exacerbated its financial straits, further delaying payment. In 1900, it paid Russia the
outstanding principal but refused to pay interest that it allegedly owed because of its failure to
pay Russia on time. In 1910, the two states submitted to arbitration the question whether the
empire owed Russia interest and, if so, how much.94
The tribunal described Turkey’s defense as force majeure “adapt[ing] itself to political necessities.”95 But to present-day international lawyers, the defense would be characterized as necessity,96 for “[i]n the case of force majeure, respecting the obligation is absolutely impossible,
whereas in the case of necessity [under Article 25], the impossibility is relative: a choice is made
between suffering the grave and imminent peril and violating an obligation protecting an interest of lesser importance.”97 At the time, however, tribunals not infrequently failed to distinguish the two. In practical terms, conflation of the two defenses in Russian Indemnity did not
affect the result, for the tribunal effectively applied the same classical conception of necessity
discussed by the precedents in the preceding section, rendering Turkey’s defense unavailing.
90
Affaire d’Indemnité Russe (Russ./Turk.), 11 R.I.A.A. 431 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912), translated in 7 AJIL 178
(1913) [hereinafter Russian Indemnity].
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7 AJIL at 183.
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Id. at 184.
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Id. at 185.
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Id. at 178.
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Id. at 195.
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The ILC COMMENTARY cites Russian Indemnity as support for both force majeure and necessity. ILC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 172, cmt. 7; id. at 180, cmt. 7.
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Heathcote, supra note 27, at 495; see also “Force Majeure” and “Fortuitous Event” as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Survey of State Practice, International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine—Study Prepared by the
Secretariat, [1978] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, pt. 1, at 61, paras. 25, 30, UN Doc. A/CN.4/315 [hereinafter Secretariat Survey].
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Yet the Russian Indemnity award illustrates an important distinction between the classical
conception of necessity and Article 25. The tribunal acknowledged that between 1881 and
1902, the empire suffered “financial difficulties of the utmost seriousness, increased by domestic and foreign events (insurrections and wars)” that placed it “in a position where it could meet
its engagements only with delay and postponements, and even then at great sacrifice.”98 The
conception of necessity set forth in Article 25, had it governed at the time, would likely have
supplied a sound defense for the empire’s delay. Turkey’s severe lack of economic health could
quite plausibly have been characterized as an “essential interest” under Article 25(1)(a). By contrast, its delay in paying Russia the outstanding interest due under an 1879 armistice treaty
could hardly be said to “seriously impair an essential interest of [Russia].”99 But absent a threat
to Turkey’s existence as a state, the tribunal held that its financial difficulties, however dire, did
not suffice to sustain the defense.
The tribunal noted that Russia “expressly admits that the obligation of a state to carry out
treaties may give way ‘if the very existence of the state should be in danger, if the observance
of the international duty is . . . self-destructive.’”100 But even the “incontestable” facts about
Turkey’s dire financial straits did not meet that threshold— on two grounds, one factual, the
other legal.101 First, as a matter of fact, Turkey could have obtained reasonable loans to pay its
outstanding debts to Russia. Second, as a matter of law:
It would clearly be exaggeration to admit that the payment (or the obtaining of a loan for
the payment) of the comparatively small sum of about six million francs due the Russian
claimants would imperil the existence of the Ottoman Empire or seriously compromise its
internal and external situation. The exception . . . cannot, therefore, be admitted.102
In other words, the Russian Indemnity tribunal accurately set the legal threshold for invoking
necessity at, to quote Article 25, “a grave and imminent peril.” But contrary to Article 25 and
consistent with every other precedent, the tribunal explained that for a necessity plea to prevail,
the relevant peril must be to the state’s existence—not to the broader and potentially far more
protean notion of its “essential interest[s].”103
Another putative example of the economic necessity paradigm is the Forests of Rhodope incident, decided by the Council of the League of Nations in 1934.104 Under an arbitral award
made in 1933,105 Greece sought 475,000 gold leva plus interest.106 Bulgaria’s representative
replied that
it was not the Bulgarian Government’s intention, as might be supposed from the Greek
Government’s action in asking for this question to be placed on the Council’s agenda . . . ,
to evade the obligation imposed upon it by the arbitral award in question. He confirmed
98
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Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(b) (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 25(1)(a).
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therefore the statement that his Government was prepared to discharge to Greece the payment stipulated in the award. The present situation of the national finances, however, prevented the Bulgarian Government from contemplating a payment in cash. His Government was nevertheless prepared to examine immediately with the Greek Government, any
other method of payment which might suit the latter. . . . The Bulgarian Government
hoped that a friendly settlement could be reached.107
Greece agreed, ending the dispute. The ILC Commentary, following Ago, says that “the two
Governments seem to have clearly recognized that a situation of necessity such as one consisting
of very serious financial difficulties could justify, if not the repudiation by a State of an international debt, at least a recourse to means of fulfilling the obligation other than those actually
envisaged by the obligation.”108
This conclusion is doubtful or, at best, overstated. First, so far as the record indicates, the
two states regarded the resolution as “a friendly settlement.” It is unclear why a settlement
would imply that Greece and Bulgaria “clearly recognized” the principle that a state’s “serious
financial difficulties could justify” the discharge of an international monetary obligation in
terms “other than those actually envisaged by the obligation.” Bulgaria did not even argue that
its fiscal straits justified a distinct form of payment. Nor did it raise necessity. It merely
expressed the hope that Greece would accept the amount Bulgaria owed in a form other than
cash. For its part, Greece never said or implied that Bulgaria’s financial troubles raised the predicate for a necessity plea or that they justified a form of payment other than cash. The evidence
suggests that Greece agreed to Bulgaria’s proposal because of its natural desire to be paid fully
and on time, and because, in all likelihood, of its indifference to the form of the payment.109
Necessity does not seem to have played a significant role, if any, in this incident.
The second paradigm that may be discerned in the economic necessity precedents cited in
the ILC Commentary involves state contracts with private business entities (rather than other
states). Société Commerciale de Belgique (SCB) is the locus classicus of this paradigm.110 Greece
contracted with SCB, a Belgian company, to construct railway lines, which Greece financed
by issuing bonds to SCB. In 1932, after the global financial crisis, Greece defaulted on its sovereign debt. Because SCB thereafter ceased to receive interest or amortization payments from
Greece, it could not pay its subcontractors and ultimately had to terminate the project. When
it brought arbitration pursuant to the underlying contract,111 Greece pleaded necessity—
styled, here again, as economic force majeure— based on its financial straits,112 arguing that
“by reason of its budgetary and monetary situation, . . . it is materially impossible for the Greek
Government to execute the awards as formulated.”113
107
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In SCB, as in Russian Indemnity, characterizing necessity as a form of force majeure is misguided and misleading. Paying the awards might have been inappropriate as a matter of political morality—that is, in view of the needs of Greece’s citizens, to whom the government owes
its paramount allegiance. But paying the awards had not been rendered impossible by a natural
event or otherwise, as Greece later conceded.114 Its financial difficulties, however dire, could
not be conceptually analogized to a natural disaster, such as a hurricane or earthquake, which
might literally render the performance of an obligation impossible. No “act of God” prevented
payment. Greece chose, albeit in difficult financial circumstances, not to pay SCB, and “circumstances rendering performance more difficult or burdensome do not constitute a case of
force majeure.”115 It is the element of choice that distinguishes force majeure from necessity.116
At any rate, the tribunal rejected Greece’s defenses, necessity included, and awarded SCB
damages.117 After Greece failed to pay, Belgium, espousing SCB’s claim, sued in the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Greece replied, in part, by renewing its economic
force majeure argument. The PCIJ formally held that because the arbitral awards were, by their
terms, “‘final and without appeal’, and since the Court ha[d] received no mandate from the
Parties in regard to them, it [could] neither confirm nor annul them either wholly or in part.”118
The Court also emphasized that “the question of Greece’s capacity to pay is outside the scope
of the proceedings before the Court” and that, “if the Court cannot invite the Greek Government and [SCB] to agree upon an arrangement corresponding to the budgetary and monetary
capacity of the debtor, still less can it indicate the bases for such an arrangement.”119 The
Court’s competence extended only to recording Greece’s recognition of the validity of the
awards, thus dispelling any doubt that the awards were res judicata.120
The ILC Commentary, after reciting the PCIJ’s holding, says that “the Court implicitly
accepted the basic principle, on which the two parties were in agreement.”121 But what principle is that? The commentary is, on its face, unclear on this point. Insofar as the PCIJ’s decision
indicates, Belgium and Greece agreed only on the uncontroversial fact that Greece had
renewed its force majeure argument and sought a decision “on the merits.”122 The Court said
that “it will suffice to note that the two Parties are in agreement: the Belgian Government asks
the Court to say that the arbitral awards have the force of res judicata, and the Greek Government asks the Court to declare it recognizes that they possess this force.”123 But if SCB is
authority for Article 25, as the ILC Commentary suggests, surely the ILC does not mean to
refer to the res judicata status of the awards; their preclusive effect does not, of course, speak
to the merits of Greece’s economic force majeure defense, which had been rejected previously
in arbitration.
114
Eighth Report Addendum, supra note 27, para. 28 (quoting Greece’s pleadings); see also Secretariat Survey,
supra note 97, para. 277.
115
Rainbow Warrior, supra note 7, para. 78; see also Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, Art. 23(1).
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Société Commerciale de Belgique, 1939 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 78 at 174.
123
Id. at 175.

464

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 106:447

By tracing the ILC Commentary’s remark back to the Articles on State Responsibility
travaux, it becomes clear that when the commentary states that “the Court implicitly accepted
the basic principle, on which the two parties were in agreement,”124 it means to refer to an
excerpt from Belgium’s oral pleadings, which the commentary does not reproduce. In that
excerpt, counsel for Belgium states:
In a learned survey . . . , Mr. Youpis [counsel for Greece] stated yesterday that a State
is not obliged to pay its debt if in order to pay it[,] it would have to jeopardize its essential
public services.
So far as the principle is concerned, the Belgian Government would no doubt be in
agreement.125
This quotation, more than anything reviewed so far, might offer some support for Article 25’s
transition from (1) the classical, existential threshold for necessity—that is, that the state’s
“very existence” be at stake, to (2) the lower threshold and broader scope suggested by the ILC
phrase “essential interest.”126 But several factors cast doubt on the extent to which inferences
about general international law can be drawn from the PCIJ’s opinion, in general, and the foregoing quotation, in particular.
First, the passage reproduced above is cherry-picked from a long and complicated litigation
record, which also includes multiple references to the traditional threshold for necessity.
Greece, for example, invoked Russian Indemnity as authority for the view that economic force
majeure refers to a situation in which the debtor’s payment “would, by reason of the amount
involved, have imperilled the existence of the debtor State or gravely jeopardized its internal
or external situation.”127 To suggest that Belgium, still less the PCIJ, agreed with Greece on
this point would overstate the implications of the quotation’s hypothetical agreement “in principle.”128
Second, the prolonged litigation that culminated in SCB included “modifications or withdrawals of submissions,”129 making it difficult to know, more than half a century later, the
extent to which the quotation from Belgium’s oral pleadings actually reflected a general, or generalizable, principle.
Third, it is not as clear as Ago and the ILC Commentary suggest that the PCIJ, in contrast
to the parties, “implicitly accepted th[is] basic principle.”130 The Court held, first, that it lacked
competence “to oblige the Belgian Government . . . to enter into negotiations with the Greek
Government with a view to a friendly arrangement regarding the execution of the arbitral
awards,” and second, that in view of the parties’ “agreement that the question of Greece’s
capacity to pay [was] outside the scope of the [PCIJ] proceedings,” the Court could not make
124
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a “declaration in law to the effect that the Greek Government is justified, owing to force
majeure, in not executing” those arbitral awards.131 Ago inferred from the above that,
by observing that . . . it could only have made such a declaration after having itself verified
the financial situation as alleged by the Greek Government and ascertained what the effects
of the execution of the awards would have been, the Court showed that it implicitly
accepted the basic principle on which the two parties were in agreement.132
That is a strained inference, given the scant evidence on this point in the PCIJ’s written opinion. A more neutral interpretation, which also better reflects the Court’s precise language, is
that the procedural posture of the case rendered impracticable any possible judicial attention
to both the factual issues raised by a plea of economic force majeure and the potential legal consequences of any such assessment. In short, the inference suggested by Ago involves assumptions that go well beyond the clear positions to which the Court committed.133
Fourth, the pleadings suggest that Greece’s conception of necessity did not, in fact, differ
much, if at all, from the classical one. Greece did not argue that because of its dire fiscal situation, paying the awards would jeopardize an essential interest; it argued that paying them
would jeopardize its very existence as a state. In concluding oral argument, counsel for Greece
stressed that paying the awards would involve a “risk . . . so large and so substantial that the
Government cannot afford to take it. There is no question of a slight danger; the very existence
of the State is at stake.”134
Fifth, neither the parties nor the PCIJ suggested that necessity might justify Greece’s failure
to pay—that is, preclude its wrongfulness under international law.135 Belgium said that if
Greece proved the allegations about its fiscal condition, its “[i]ncapacity to pay [could] entail
only a full or partial suspension of payment, which may moreover be modified and terminated;
it [could] not entail release from the debt, even in part.”136 Greece did not disagree.137 If its
necessity defense had prevailed, that defense might, at most, have temporarily suspended
Greece’s obligation to pay immediately.138 Yet even this more modest inference sits uneasily
with the ILC’s classification of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, for as Ago
wrote of CPWs in general:
The conduct in question cannot be characterized as wrongful for the good reason that,
owing to the presence in that particular case of certain circumstances, the State which
committed the act was not under any international obligation to conduct itself otherwise. In other words, there is not wrongfulness when one of the circumstances . . . is
present . . . .139
131
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Finally, even the most charitable reading of SCB vis-à-vis Article 25 would not suggest that
the PCIJ or the state litigants understood Greece’s plea as a call for the tribunal to consider the
essential interests of Greece, the invoking state, juxtaposed against the degree of impairment
to “an essential interest of ” Belgium, “the State . . . towards which the [breached] obligation
exists.”140 The idea of comparing or balancing the essential interests of states (or the international community as a whole) against one other is an innovation of Article 25.
Doubtless the PCIJ sympathized with Greece. It praised Belgium’s willingness to negotiate
a payment schedule to accommodate Greece’s fiscal straits and recorded Belgium’s statements
in that regard.141 But the Court did not clearly recognize, even in dicta, a new substantive
defense resembling Article 25 that could have potentially justified (that is, precluded the attribution of wrongfulness to) Greece’s failure to meet its financial obligations under a concededly
valid arbitral award. International, like national, courts frequently both encourage settlements
and praise accommodations between the parties. As the judicial organ of the League of Nations,
it would be unsurprising for the PCIJ to construe its institutional mandate to conform to the
Covenant’s broader objectives relating to peaceful dispute settlement.142 In the final analysis,
if SCB is an authority for Article 25 at all, it is a weak one, and the remaining economic force
majeure precedents cited in the ILC Commentary offer thin, if any, support for Article 25’s
conception of necessity.143
Ecological necessity. The final area of international law in which Article 25’s definition of
necessity is said to find support is in precedents on environmental or ecological preservation.
In the Russian Fur Seals dispute,144 for example, increased predatory sealing in the late nineteenth century had led to a decline in the number of seals frequenting rookeries in waters
that were adjacent to Russia but neither subject to its maritime jurisdiction nor regulated by
treaty.145 In 1892, the Zabraka, a Russian cruiser, seized three British sealing vessels in waters
more than forty miles from the Commander Islands,146 a maritime area well beyond Russia’s
territorial sea and the sites of previous seizures.147 Russia authorized the captures even though
it had no treaty with Britain that prohibited the latter’s sealing in that maritime area,148 and
140
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in 1893, Russia issued a decree purporting to prohibit the taking of seals within ten nautical
miles of its coast and thirty nautical miles of the Commander Islands.149
The ILC Commentary apparently includes this incident because the Russian foreign minister justified the seizures based on what he described in his exchange with the British ambassador as the “absolute necessity of immediate precautionary measures.”150 But the foreign minister’s use of the word “necessity” does not appear to have indicated, expressly or implicitly,
a claim of legal necessity. Insofar as Russia defended its conduct in legal terms at all, the
foreign minister ascribed Russia’s seizures to “the pressure of exceptional circumstances.”151
Implicitly conceding that it lacked a viable legal defense, the foreign minister proposed that
Russia’s seizure of the vessels “may be regarded as a case of force majeure and assimilated
to cases of self-defence.”152 It is true, as we have seen, that force majeure and necessity were
sometimes conflated at the time of that incident.153 But necessity, force majeure, and selfdefense all would have failed to provide a viable defense for Russia’s conduct in the Russian
Fur Seals incident.154 Britain ultimately accepted Russia’s somewhat exorbitant maritime
claims but insisted, understandably, that the arrangement operate prospectively only,
foreclosing any claim for reparations.155 More to the point, no evidence suggests that either
state regarded this incident as involving a plea of necessity.156 Depending on one’s methodological views, the incident might nonetheless be viewed as a form of state practice that contributes to the modern customary law of necessity. But if so, it is not especially helpful support
for Article 25. Unlike that article, the conception of necessity at issue in the Russian Fur Seals
incident did not involve any consideration of the competing “essential interests” of Russia and
Britain.
In the Torrey Canyon incident, a Liberian oil tanker collided with submerged rocks off the
coast of Cornwall, spilling oil into areas just beyond British territorial waters. After several
unavailing efforts to contain the spill and avert damage to the coast, the United Kingdom
bombed the vessel, burning up any remaining oil.157 The ILC Commentary cites this incident
even though, as it concedes, the United Kingdom did not advance necessity or, for that matter,
149
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any legal argument in defense of its conduct.158 It is an arguable, but far from clear or robust,
inference that the absence of protest from other states qualifies as negative state practice contributing to Article 25’s customary status.159 But affirmative state practice points in the other
direction, for almost immediately thereafter, states hastily concluded a multilateral treaty on
oil spills,160 from which it may with equal force be inferred that states preferred to establish clear
international law on the legal issues arising out of such accidental spills rather than to leave
comparable future incidents to the unilateral judgments of affected states.
The Fisheries Jurisdiction decision seems equally inapposite.161 Briefly, when Canada
accepted the ICJ’s general jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, it included a general reservation as to disputes arising out of measures related to fishing vessels in the maritime
Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). The same day,
Canada statutorily directed its navy to seize and search vessels that were taking “straddling
stocks” or that fell within certain enumerated classes of vessels in the NAFO Regulatory
Area.162 Pursuant to this directive, Canada’s navy seized several vessels fishing for Greenland
halibut, including the Estai, a Spanish vessel, which the navy seized approximately 245 miles
from the Canadian coastline—within the NAFO Regulatory Area but beyond Canada’s exclusive economic zone under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Spain brought suit before
the ICJ, arguing that the seizure constituted illegal force and violated Article 92 of the Convention or a substantially identical customary rule.163 The ICJ did not reach the merits; it disavowed jurisdiction based on Canada’s clear reservation.164
The ILC Commentary nonetheless treats Fisheries Jurisdiction as support for Article 25,
apparently because Canada defended the Estai’s seizure as “necessary in order to put a stop to
the overfishing of Greenland halibut by Spanish fishermen”165 and because the preamble to
Canada’s national law stipulated that because “foreign fishing vessels continue to fish for [certain enumerated] stocks in the NAFO Regulatory Area,” Canada deemed “urgent action necessary to prevent further destruction of those stocks and to permit their rebuilding, while continuing to seek effective international solutions to the situation.”166 But no evidence suggests
that Canada meant by these words to plead necessity. Nor did Spain perceive the situation in
that way.167
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As in the Russian Fur Seals incident, the ILC Commentary treats the use of the word “necessary” as a precedent that lends support to Article 25’s particular conception of necessity as a
legal plea. That inference is dubious. No evidence suggests that Canada intended to raise necessity as a legal defense. Nor, apparently, did Canada even perceive a need to cite an international
legal defense (especially because that would seem to be an implicit admission of potential state
responsibility): in its view, no wrongful act existed to preclude.
Again, perhaps according to certain methodological perspectives on custom, it might be reasonable to regard Fisheries Jurisdiction as support for some conception of necessity in international law. But it is difficult to see how the case supports the particular conception set forth in
Article 25. As with the other ecological necessity precedents discussed in the ILC Commentary,
neither the states involved (nor the ICJ, when brought into the conflict) saw the legal question
as whether a grave and imminent peril to one of the invoking state’s essential interests justified
“impair[ing] an essential interest of [another] State or States . . . or of the international community as a whole.”168
Necessity as a General Principle?
In terms of the traditional “sources” of international law, the distinction between custom
and “general principles of law”169 is not always clear. At times, the two overlap or apply concurrently. It may well be artificial to scrutinize Article 25 separately under the rubric of general principles. But because necessity is a defense in many modern national legal systems,170 we should
consider briefly whether necessity, in general, and Article 25, in particular, might be best
understood as a general principle of law. Bin Cheng—whose sixty-year-old treatise remains,
despite its age, the classic treatise on general principles—included necessity as one of them:171
If, after every conceivable legal means of self-preservation has first been exhausted, the
very existence of the State is still in danger, and if there exists only one single means of escaping from such danger, the State is justified in having recourse to that means in self-preservation, even though it may otherwise be unlawful.172
As the italicized language suggests, Cheng’s definition is strongly redolent of the classical conception and is, again, in tension with Ago’s categorical statement that “self-preservation and
state of necessity are in no way identical, nor are they indissolubly linked in the sense that one
is merely the basis and justification of the other.”173
Furthermore, despite the word “justified” in Cheng’s definition, elsewhere he refers to necessity as an excuse or simply equates the two rubrics174—which modern scholars regard as analytically mistaken.175 If one regards necessity as having the status of lex lata, the neglect or elision of this distinction is problematic. In the first place, significant legal consequences often,
168
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though not always,176 follow from characterizing a defense as an excuse or a justification (for
example, the implications of the defense for third parties). Moreover, as we will see, national
legal systems do not share a uniform conception of necessity, and the justification/excuse distinction is perhaps the paramount fault line between diverse national conceptions. Some states
treat necessity as an excuse; others, as a justification, and still others, as one or the other, depending on context. A comprehensive analysis of necessity in national legal systems would disclose
considerable variation.177 In what sense, then, might necessity qualify as a general principle
of law?
In a well-known typology, Oscar Schachter discerned five conceptions of general principles
“invoked and applied in international law discourse and cases”:
(1) The principles of municipal law “recognized by civilized nations”.
(2) General principles of law “derived from the specific nature of the international
community”.
(3) Principles “intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems”.
(4) Principles “valid through all kinds of societies in relationships of hierarchy and coordination”.
(5) Principles of justice founded on “the very nature of man as a rational and social
being”.178
Insofar as Cheng defines necessity in terms that echo the classical conception, he situates the
defense in the second category—that is, as a principle “derived from the specific nature of the
international community.”179 Cheng’s analysis therefore reinforces the continuing vitality of
the classical conception, at least as of 1953, when he published his treatise. It does not support
Article 25’s distinct conception of necessity. Nor do the authorities on which Cheng relies,
most of which have been reviewed already.180
Conclusion
Before an earlier draft of Article 25 led the ICJ to analyze necessity in its explicit terms,181
few, if any, decision makers had understood necessity—as a defense in the law of state responsibility—in the terms set forth in that article. From its origins in the classical law of nations to
the last decade of the twentieth century, international custom recognized a narrow defense of
176
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typology seem incongruous as applied to necessity in the context of a legal system (international law, in general, and
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necessity, which was based on the supposedly natural right of states to preserve themselves. The
classical conception of the defense did not, as the rubric “[c]ircumstances precluding wrongfulness”182 suggests, render lawful certain conduct that would otherwise have been unlawful;
rather, it temporarily suspended or excused a state’s failure to carry out its international legal
obligations under circumstances in which compliance would arguably imperil the state’s very
existence. Furthermore, once the state of necessity passed, the weight of authority suggests that
international law obligated the invoking state to pay reparations. Finally, even in this limited
form, so far as research discloses, no international tribunal before the twenty-first century had
sustained on the merits a claim of necessity. Until the ICJ’s 1997 judgment in Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project,183 Herbert Jenner’s advice to the British Crown in two incidents in the early
nineteenth century may have been as close to an affirmative precedent for necessity as existed
in state practice or international jurisprudence.
Until recently, necessity could therefore be most accurately described as a highly circumscribed defense in the law of state responsibility— one based on the idea that in a legal system
chiefly governing states, no state could be expected to adhere to an obligation if doing so threatened that state’s “very existence” as a state and therefore as a proper subject of the law of nations.
It may be helpful at this stage to rephrase this classical conception in Article 25’s terms. One
might say, in this regard, that classical necessity recognized only one “essential interest” sufficient to underwrite a necessity plea—namely, an imminent threat to the existence of the state
qua state. The ILC has suggested otherwise,184 and Article 25 provides a distinct conception
of necessity. But the tribunal decisions and other past practice cited to support this view call
into question the widely adopted conclusion that Article 25 codifies existing general international law. Article 25 is partially, if not substantially, innovative—that is, progressive development.
Innovative does not mean or imply anything pejorative; to the contrary, in international,
even more than national, law, Justice Holmes’s maxim decrying legal anachronisms has particular force,185 and necessity may well require rethinking in the twenty-first century. As progressive development, Article 25 may or may not be normatively prudent or appealing. The
evidence reviewed thus far simply suggests that, as of the 2001 publication of the Articles on
State Responsibility, Article 25 probably did not codify existing general international law. This
conclusion is hardly a radical one. In the final edition of his treatise, for example, Ian Brownlie,
one of the preeminent positivists among twentieth-century international lawyers, echoed the
reservations of several tribunals186 when he expressed doubt that international law recognizes
necessity as an “omnibus” defense to state responsibility.187 The real question is whether it
should.
182
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II. SOME PERILS OF THE NATIONAL LAW ANALOGY
Part I established that in terms of the ILC’s formal mandate,188 Article 25 reflects progressive
development. Some of its phrases and locutions echo classical necessity. But Article 25 reorients the classical plea in at least four ways. First, it recasts necessity as a justification rather than
an excuse.189 Second, it expands the plea’s ambit to reach not only circumstances threatening
state self-preservation but any “essential interest,”190 a phrase that may well enable dangerously
protean interpretation. Third, in effect if not strictly in form, Article 25 introduces a balancing
test redolent of the choice-of-evils necessity paradigm found in some national legal systems.191
Fourth, and again echoing national law, Article 25 excludes the necessity plea categorically if
the invoking state “contributed to the situation”192 that culminated in its invoking necessity.
These changes raise serious questions about the precise nature and scope of necessity as
reconceived by Article 25. Yet absent centralized, international institutions comparable in
competence and efficacy to those in national law, the “exceptional”193 plea of necessity, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, threatens to “expand itself to the limit of its logic”—for, insofar as Article 25 modifies the classical plea, it does not “confine itself within the limits of its history.”194
By so revising necessity, Article 25 also invites inquiry into its contemporary rationale.
A venerable maxim provides that a legal rule should extend no further than its rationale: cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex. But unmoored from its pedigree as an existential limit on the
law of nations, the rationale for necessity, as reconceptualized by Article 25, is neither obvious
nor uncontroversial. Partially for this reason, it will often be unclear how to interpret the plea
or discern its limits. A natural right of anthropomorphic states to preserve themselves makes
sense, if it still does, only insofar as international law limits necessity to the traditional context
of threats to state survival. Absent this limitation derived from supposedly natural law—which,
in contemporary political theory and international law alike, seems anachronistic—the normative prudence and appeal of a general necessity plea, such as Article 25, calls for further
reflection.
But if neither history nor precedent explains Article 25, what does? Article 25’s text suggests
that the answer lies partially in the influence of national law. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the ILC self-consciously pursued this analogy. Nearly fifty years of travaux préparatoires include little evidence to that effect and equally scant analysis of national law conceptions
of necessity. Ago acknowledged the influence of national law on certain publicists.195 But he
remarks only briefly upon national law conceptions of necessity, chiefly to caution (appropriately, in my view) that while “general principles of national law” may “be of some help,” the
ILC must “b[ear] in mind, firstly that determining their existence in this matter is by no means
188
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as easy as one might wish, and, secondly, that transferring them from the field of relations
between individuals to that of relations between States is a dubious undertaking.”196 More
recently, Special Rapporteur James Crawford explained that all CPWs “operate like general
defences or excuses in national legal systems.”197 They function “more as a shield than a sword,”
for while “they may protect the State against an otherwise well-founded accusation of wrongful
conduct, they do not strike down the obligation, and the underlying source of the obligation,
the primary rule, is not affected by them as such.”198
Semantically, at least, Crawford’s statement is puzzling. It suggests that “circumstances precluding wrongfulness” do not, in fact, preclude wrongfulness. If they did, the conduct at issue
would be justified, rather than wrongful but excused, vis-à-vis the primary rule. In general,
however, that is not the effect of a CPW. Rather, it suspends temporarily the invoking state’s
obligation to honor what continues to be a binding international obligation, thus functioning
more like an excuse than a justification as modern lawyers understand those terms. At the same
time, closer consideration of the seven CPWs suggests that their effects may differ from one
another. Some CPWs justify otherwise wrongful conduct (for example, consent or self-defense), whereas others excuse it (for example, distress or force majeure).
At times, this distinction in CPWs between those that justify and those that excuse may be
one without a difference. But at other times, CPWs that only excuse (but do not justify) may
require ex post reparations.199 I will revisit this issue below. It suffices here to observe that
although the travaux préparatoires do not suggest that the ILC self-consciously adopted ideas
from, or analogies to, national law, Article 25’s text, implicitly and in practice, recasts necessity,
in part, in terms of a balance between the often competing (respective) essential interests of two
or more states (or of the international community as a whole). This balancing dynamic resembles the one required by the choice-of-evils paradigm of necessity found in some national legal
systems. Mongolia recognized this point explicitly in the course of ILC deliberations, emphasizing “the difficulty of balancing individual State interests against international obligations”
and the abuses to which any such process might lend itself.200 Furthermore, Article 25(2)(b)’s
categorical exclusion based on contribution resembles a similar exclusion in several national
legal systems.
National law analogies remain a common, but often perilous, heuristic device in international legal discourse.201 Some scholarship on necessity in international law directly analogizes
it to necessity in national criminal law,202 even though, among other defects in the analogy, the
law of state responsibility does not subject, and never has subjected, states to criminal liability.203 In general, efforts to understand necessity in the international law of state responsibility
196
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through the lens of national law might illuminate it in some respects but will surely distort it
in others.204 Still, Article 25 does, textually at least, include or resemble ideas apparent in
national law conceptions of necessity—in particular, (1) exclusion of the plea based on contribution and (2) the de facto requirement that states, in the first instance, and decision makers,
after the fact, weigh the essential interests of states against one another (or against those of the
international community as a whole). Each of these ideas proves problematic in the context of
state responsibility. To appreciate why, a brief digression into the predominant conceptions
of necessity in national law is informative.
Necessity in National Criminal Law
Two conceptions of necessity prevail in national legal systems: first, “duress of circumstances,” or excused necessity; and second, the choice-of-evils paradigm, or, to adopt the parallel
shorthand, justified necessity.205
Excused necessity. Excused necessity arguably informs at least one of the ideas that Article 25
incorporates: that the invoking state’s contribution excludes the defense. As its name implies,
excused necessity excuses actors from liability insofar as they acted under circumstances that
the law regards as sufficient to compromise their agency unfairly. The circumstances excuse the
actor but do not, to paraphrase Article 25, preclude the wrongfulness of the act. Excused necessity also does not require the defendant, ex ante, or a decision maker, ex post, to balance social
evils against one other. Because of the inherent difficulties of such a process, many regard its
absence as one of excused necessity’s chief virtues.206
The gravamen of excused necessity is a “concession to human frailty.”207 Its rationale is “that
strong understandable emotions in extreme circumstances may effectively block the defendant’s capacity for making moral choices on which criminal liability is normally premised.”208
Variations on this paradigm exist in many national systems.209 Unlike the choice-of-evils paradigm, which appeals to the idea that, ceteris paribus, an actor should choose the greater social
good, the rationale for excused necessity depends ineluctably on beliefs about the nature of the
actor, not the act. The core intuition is that even those who act voluntarily in the minimal sense
required for liability210 may not have had a meaningful or fair opportunity to exercise their
agency under extenuating circumstances of severe duress. Such persons therefore either should
not be held liable at all or should be held liable only in rough proportion to their culpable contribution to the circumstances culminating in the situation to which the necessity defense may
apply.
One plausible rationale for excused necessity is consequentialist in nature. “Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife,” as Justice Holmes memorably
204
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put it, albeit in the distinct context of self-defense.211 But this rationale is weak. People differ
in their capacities to cope with, and inclination to endure, threats—not to mention their criminal propensities. From a consequentialist perspective, it might optimize deterrence to eschew
excused necessity and instead allow only mitigation, not a full defense, based on ex post judgments by a decision maker.212 So argued James Fitzjames Stephen when he famously remarked
that “it is at the moment when temptation to crime is strongest that the law should speak most
clearly and emphatically to the contrary.”213 The better and more common rationale for
excused necessity is a broadly shared intuition that a defendant who acts wrongfully because
of the severe pressure of an unusual threat is less culpable. As relevant here, note that under
either rationale, excused necessity assumes that the actor is a human being (not a state) who
shares the characteristic traits and frailties of our species.214 The defense makes sense only on
that basis.
It would therefore be strange—and more to the point, a potential source of serious
abuse—to apply a cognate rationale in the context of state responsibility. National law can
meaningfully establish a standard for excused necessity based on, for example, “a person of reasonable firmness in his situation.”215 That is not obviously or even likely true for states. Of
course, states can be, and they often are, subjected to severe pressure by circumstances, including threats from other states. But it is precisely because power dynamics of this sort so thoroughly permeate international law that only the most literal forms of coercion—that is, the
threat or use of force in violation of the UN Charter— can be accepted as a legitimate ground
for excusing or voiding an international obligation. To recognize a general defense based on,
say, extreme diplomatic or economic coercion would seriously destabilize the international
legal system.
Article 25 is therefore prudent insofar as it largely avoids the conceptual baggage of excused
necessity—largely, but not entirely. Paragraph (2)(b) excludes necessity if “the [invoking] State
has contributed to the situation of necessity.” As we will see,216 this clause raises several difficult
questions, foremost among them: (1) the nature and scope of exclusionary contribution—that
is, what it means for a state’s contribution “to the situation” to be “sufficiently substantial and
not merely incidental and peripheral”;217 and (2) whether contribution refers to the actor’s
fault or merely to its conduct (or lack thereof ). Article 25 seems to adopt the latter conception.
Still, it is unclear whether or why genuinely blameless state conduct culminating in a state’s
invocation of necessity should categorically preclude the defense. But the alternative—that is,
adopting the “fault” interpretation of contribution—raises its own difficulties. Crawford has
suggested that the issue cannot be decided generally but must be resolved on the basis of the
implicated primary rules.218 That approach may well be appropriate in considering the exclusion for contribution.
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Justified necessity. The analogy to justified necessity, often characterized as a “lesser evils” or
“choice of evils”219 defense, requires a more extensive analysis. Article 25(1) structurally
appears to call for a similar judgment, and the consequentialist logic of the paradigm might also
be viewed as the chief rationale for Article 25. This conception of necessity pervades U.S. criminal law, initially as a legacy of the common law and more recently because of the Model Penal
Code’s influence.220 Yet it is by no means limited to the United States or to common law jurisdictions.221 Despite important variations, the conceptual core of this paradigm is always and
everywhere the same: it is justifiable (and hence not wrongful) for an actor to choose the lesser
of two social harms or evils.222 Other criteria vary by jurisdiction. But for present purposes, the
relevant issues arise in connection with the core conceptual framework that Article 25(1) shares
with the justified-necessity paradigm in national law. Unsurprisingly, facial similarities
between the two perspectives obscure deeper differences, and it is questionable whether adopting some variation of the justified-necessity paradigm as an element of the law of state responsibility is normatively prudent or appealing. For analytic purposes, the paradigm’s essential
contours will first be described briefly, and we will then consider how and why its adaptation
to the law of state responsibility in Article 25(1) seems especially problematic.
First, the choice-of-evils paradigm requires actors to compare competing values and interests—that is, to weigh them against one another. It therefore perforce assumes that these values
and interests can, in principle, be ranked ordinally in a normative hierarchy. Yet it is far from
clear that a normative hierarchy sufficient for a comparable ranking exists in general international law.223 Because of what former justice Robert Jackson referred to (in a distinct context)
as “the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes,”224 the normative hierarchy in a national legal system is almost always implicit in, and inferred from, not only positive
laws but the principles that animate them and the sociopolitical context in which they operate.225 Almost every national legal system, for example, values life above property. In this
regard, as Glanville Williams wrote, “although the defence of necessity is subjective as to facts,
219
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it is objective as to values.”226 The actor invoking necessity must, at the time that he acts, choose
what he subjectively believes to be the lesser evil. But he chooses at his peril. His belief about
the comparative weight of what are, by hypothesis, competing values is ultimately immaterial.
What matters is the objective normative hierarchy implicit in the sociopolitical community to
which he belongs and in the legal order within which he acts. Necessity will be unavailing unless
he chooses the lesser evil in that sense.227
Second, for the above reason, and a fortiori because of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege), the choice-of-evils paradigm requires that actors be able to ascertain, in a rough
and ready sense, how to weigh competing values and interests. They must enjoy at least “lawyer’s notice” in this regard, and legal institutions must express or imply how to ordinally rank
values and interests,228 including incommensurable ones—that is, those that defy efforts to measure
them along a common scale. A formulation of necessity such as Article 25 or section 3.02 of the
Model Penal Code can supply the figurative scale. But only the relevant legal community’s social
process can supply the measurements. In other words, an abstract definition of necessity cannot
exclude ab initio any social value or interest; only legal institutions that express the polity’s choices
can do so. That is why Williams emphasized that “[n]ecessity cannot be used to set aside the values
expressed in the law; it can only qualify and modify them.”229 We should add that it can qualify
and modify them only insofar as the relevant legislature theoretically would have so qualified or
modified them—that is, had it foreseen the circumstances requiring a choice of evils.
Third, what makes necessity, so conceived, an administrable defense—and one widely
regarded as consistent with the rule of law—is the presence of reliable and effective legal institutions, including a general legislature, a hierarchical court system with compulsory jurisdiction, and a disciplined police force. These institutions fulfill indispensable functions for the
lesser-evils paradigm. In particular, they (1) express, ex ante, which social values and interests
count, and for how much, (2) help to resolve clashes between what may be competing values
and interests in some contexts, and (3) enforce, ex post, the polity’s choices in this regard. The
prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction of the legislative, judicial, and executive institutions, respectively, in a national legal system that adopts the choice-of-evils model
must therefore be sufficiently general to enable them to make and enforce the polity’s choices.
Subjects of the law who find themselves in a circumstance that the legislature did not foresee
must be able to act against the background of a relatively integrated, unified, and comprehensive legal code. At a minimum, it must offer notice and guidance about how to weigh dissimilar
sociopolitical interests or values.
Typically, therefore, a general legislature decides in the first instance, by positive law and
inferences to be drawn from it, on the rough contours of the normative hierarchy. It decides
(or codifies) what counts as an evil and, even if only in a general way, how to compare evils that
likely be misguided. For a more detailed analysis and critique of the idea of a normative hierarchy in international
law, see generally Caplan, supra note 223.
226
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might be in tension with one another. It remits this choice to legal actors, subject to ex post
appraisal by the judiciary,230 only in an unanticipated situation that “calls for an exception to
the criminal prohibition that the legislature could not reasonably have intended to exclude,
given the competing values to be weighed.”231 In short, this paradigm of necessity operates as
a “gap-filler, recognizing exceptions in order to further legislative values already recognized in
the penal code”;232 it “allows us to act as individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal
provision or crafting a one-time exception to it . . . when a real legislature would formally do
the same under those circumstances.”233 Absent legislative guidance, a court of general jurisdiction or a jury, as the presumptive voice of societal norms,234 decides if the actor chose the
lesser evil. In the civil law tradition, this task perforce falls to a professional judge.235 But the
point of emphasis is simply that in either tradition, for the rule of law to be respected, the
choice-of-evils paradigm requires effective legal institutions, which legal subjects perceive as
legitimate. Otherwise, as the proverb has it, necessity would indeed “[have] no law”: necessitas
non habet legem.236
Sovereign Lesser Evils?
Given the preceding exposition, it should be clear that the choice-of-evils conception of justified necessity is, at best, a problematic paradigm to adapt to the law of state responsibility—
and yet Article 25 structurally resembles this paradigm and, at least to that extent, departs from
the classical (and arguably still customary) conception of necessity. Five disanalogies, in particular, afflict the rough transposition of the choice-of-evils model to the law of state responsibility.
First, general international law lacks the comparatively high degree of normative consensus
that characterizes well-functioning national legal systems. People disagree, of course, within
every polity, and hard cases arise with some frequency. But in the main, the constituents of any
particular polity can be expected to rank social interests and values similarly. This expectation
is not plausible in general international law. To speak anthropomorphically, a state may be
expected—reasonably and often not inappropriately—to prioritize its own “essential interests”
above those of other states and, a fortiori, those of the figurative international community as
a whole. Perhaps it would even violate political morality for a state’s political elite to reason
otherwise. States owe their prime allegiance to their constituents. Officials might betray that
allegiance if they prioritized the interests of another state or the international community as
a whole above the imperative to “safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
230
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peril.”237 Political theory aside, it would surely be quixotic to imagine a state’s officials engaging
in any figurative balancing analysis of the oft competing interests to which Article 25(1) refers.
Second, international law lacks an analogue to a general legislature,238 as well as the comparatively well-integrated mosaics of interrelated legal and moral norms that characterize wellfunctioning national legal systems. It would be incongruous to regard necessity in the general
law of state responsibility as a kind of figurative interstitial legislation, which, by analogy, might
authorize an informal amendment or one-time exception to a legal obligation “when a real legislature would formally do the same under those circumstances.”239
Third, although the law of state responsibility is often analogized, very roughly, to national
tort law,240 it cannot precisely be analogized to any discrete category of legal obligations in
national law. The concept of state
responsibility in international law differs fundamentally from the concept of responsibility
in national legal orders. International law subjects all breaches of all rules of international
law, irrespective of their origin and contents, to a uniform set of secondary principles. Contrary to many national systems, it does not distinguish between contractual and tortious
responsibility or between civil, criminal, and public law (“administrative”) responsibility.
The rules of state responsibility form a single system, without any precise counterpart in
national legal systems.241
Doubtless the tort analogy can be helpful pedagogically and otherwise.242 But it is not at all
precise. Reparation for the violation of an international obligation, for example, may take
forms that do not exist in national tort law.243
Fourth, given the absence of both the effective institutions and the comparatively high
degree of normative consensus that exist in robust national legal systems, necessity in the law
of state responsibility is perforce self-judging ex ante, even though (as everyone agrees) it is not,
and cannot be, ex post.244 These features of international law render the familiar strategies by
which national law deters necessity’s abuse unavailable in most instances. Consider, for example, legislative preclusion or the ex post appraisal of an actor’s choice by a court or other authoritative decision maker with compulsory jurisdiction— common techniques in national law
that seldom exist in general international law.245 Yet the risk of necessity’s pretextual use and
237
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abuse in international law is no less (to the contrary, probably far more) acute than in national
law—as the ILC Commentary recognizes.246
Fifth, the diverse peoples of states, even more than “the People”247 of one state, can reasonably be expected to disagree about (1) core moral, social, political, and cultural values, (2) their
appropriate instantiation in the law, and (3) their lexical priority.248 The “margin of appreciation” doctrine recognizes reasonable variations of this sort in the context of some regional
human rights systems.249 But it would still be incongruous to conceptualize necessity in the law
of state responsibility as an international “gap-filler, recognizing exceptions in order to further
legislative values already recognized in the [law]”250 by the international community as a
whole.
Doubtless that community does share a few fundamental value judgments—foremost
among them, those corresponding to jus cogens norms—and Article 26 of the Articles on State
Responsibility properly exempts from the CPWs the primary rules that qualify as jus cogens.
But Vaughan Lowe has rightly pointed out that the class of jus cogens norms is “nowhere near
being sufficiently comprehensive in its claimed coverage, let alone in its accepted reach.”251
Moreover, it is precisely in those circumstances in which states can be expected to invoke Article
25 that shared values or interests seldom exist. If one state invokes necessity to safeguard what
it sees as its “essential interest” against a “grave and imminent peril,” it will be the rare case in
which its necessitated conduct does not simultaneously impair an essential interest of the state
or states to which it owes the relevant international legal obligation. One may speculate with
reasonable confidence that the latter state will characterize the impairment of its “essential
interest” as “serious,”252 underscoring again that in many instances, it will be critical to have
access to a neutral, authoritative decision maker that is both competent and institutionally
suited to resolve conflicts of this sort.
In sum, experience and common sense suggest that states—naturally and often neither
unreasonably nor improperly—prioritize their own interests. It is unlikely that an increasingly
decentralized and fragmented international legal system, which serves a heterogeneous legal
community and operates, in general, without reliable institutional analogues to national legal
Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§2340 –2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 41, 91–93 (David Cole ed., 2009).
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institutions, can incorporate a principle calling for the adoption of the lesser evil under the circumstances of crisis in which Article 25 will foreseeably be invoked: Which is the lesser evil?
According to whom? What tribunal or other institution decides? With the limited exception
of jus cogens norms like the prohibition on genocide, general international law will generally
lack both the degree of consensus and the institutions required to resolve disputes involving
the competing “essential interests” of states.
Of course, necessity may not differ in the foregoing respects from many other international
legal norms. The point of emphasis is simply that Article 25’s conception of necessity perforce
requires subjective choice253—in the first instance (ex ante), by the invoking state, and in the
second (ex post), by an international decision maker. It cannot be objectively appraised with
the same certitude or in the same manner as, for example, a hurricane that gives rise to a
force majeure plea. Article 25 compels a value-laden judgment that differs qualitatively from
other CPWs.254
Conclusion
As a general defense to state responsibility, necessity neither can nor should be analogized
to necessity in national law. Yet Article 25’s structure is, in practice if not intent, redolent of
the national choice-of-evils paradigm in that it appears to presume that (1) the increasingly
fragmented international legal system offers decision makers a sufficient, and sufficiently clear,
consensus on a rough normative hierarchy within the diverse mosaic of social interests, policies,
and values comprehended within that system,255 (2) invoking states can and should be held to
an objective standard requiring the comparison of dissimilar harms to states or the “international community as a whole” (and in circumstances of imminent crisis, no less), and (3) international law can make sense of “contribut[ion] to the situation of necessity”256 in a dynamic
global order of increasingly interdependent states—for the invoking state will almost always
have “contributed to the situation” to some degree and in some fashion.
Before scrutinizing Article 25 in greater depth, we should consider a reasonable objection.
Perhaps Article 25 does not contemplate that states will look to it for guidance or try to conform
their conduct to it; rather, it merely states a rule of decision for tribunals and the like. Put otherwise, to adapt Jeremy Bentham’s distinction, Article 25 speaks chiefly to officials charged
with deciding disputes rather than to legal actors: it is a “decision rule,” not a “conduct rule.”257
After all, the Articles on State Responsibility aspire to establish a set of secondary rules, which
apply uniformly to the diverse primary rules in most every field of international law, absent a
lex specialis. Indeed, Special Rapporteur Crawford refers to the primary/secondary rule distinction as “the central organizing idea” of the Articles on State Responsibility.258
253
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That this distinction is both central and indispensable cannot be doubted. But does the status of the Articles on State Responsibility as secondary rules mean that Article 25 is only, or
that it will in practice function only as, a decision rule? That seems substantively wrong and,
at any rate, unlikely in practice. Doubtless one important purpose of the Articles on State
Responsibility is to offer a uniform framework for use in formal disputes implicating state
responsibility. But the idea of a world of “acoustic separation” between conduct and decision
rules is, as Meir Dan-Cohen stressed in his celebrated article, no more than a heuristic device:
“In the real world, the public and officialdom are not in fact locked into acoustically sealed
chambers, and consequently each group may ‘hear’ the normative messages the law transmits
to the other group.”259 Decision rules almost invariably influence conduct.260 In part because
international, unlike national, law does not rely on the regular availability of authoritative, neutral decision makers, it would be a mistake to relegate the Articles on State Responsibility to
the status of “pure” decision rules.261
Of course, the law of state responsibility does not uniquely determine how states will act
within its ambit—no more than international law does in any other subfield. But it is a variable
in the decision process. Officials consider the law of state responsibility in shaping their internal
laws and global interactions. The Articles on State Responsibility cannot be limited to a default
choice of law, so to speak, for international tribunals adjudicating arguable violations of primary rules. They guide state conduct, and Article 25 does not differ from the remainder of the
Articles on State Responsibility in this regard. Mindful of this dual function, the next part scrutinizes Article 25’s conception of necessity in greater depth.
III. CONSTRUING ARTICLE 25
Justification or Excuse?
As noted earlier, necessity is one of seven CPWs262 set forth in Chapter V of the Articles on
State Responsibility.263 The phrase “circumstances precluding wrongfulness,” within which
Article 25 is situated, semantically denotes justification. CPWs do not vitiate or mitigate state
responsibility; they render the conduct not wrongful—that is, justified.264 In fact, conduct so justified might even be laudable if, for example, it conforms to an ideal moral standard stipulating how
the figurative international community as a whole would want states to act under the circumstances in question. Humanitarian intervention may be a case in point.265 Furthermore, it
would be linguistically strained to read the phrase “circumstances precluding wrongfulness” as
259
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261
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implying excuse—that is, vitiation of legal responsibility and the consequences that ordinarily
attend it but simultaneous affirmation that the state, nonetheless, acted wrongfully.
Despite the superficial clarity of the text, the status of CPWs, in general, and of necessity,
in particular, remains ambiguous vis-à-vis the distinction between justification and excuse.266
In 1956, the first special rapporteur on state responsibility, F. V. Garciá Amador, observed that
international law distinguishes between “exonerating grounds properly so called, and other
grounds which may be considered as extenuating or aggravating circumstances.”267 About two
decades later, in 1979, Special Rapporteur Ago stressed that CPWs do not merely preclude
legal responsibility but “preclude the characterization of the conduct . . . as wrongful.”268 He
concluded that “as a result of [a CPW’s] presence the objective element of the internationally
wrongful act, namely, the breach of an international obligation, is lacking.”269 This approach
apparently endured into the 1990s, and the travaux from that period indicate an intent to treat
all CPWs as justifications.
In 1999, however, Special Rapporteur Crawford adopted a new approach. Observing that
“defences,” “justifications,” and “excuses” have all been used at times to describe various
CPWs,270 and citing the sometimes conflicting views of states on the appropriate characterization of each CPW,271 he recognized that the CPWs technically conflate two conceptually
distinct types of defenses (justification and excuse) within a single rubric.272 He decided against
drawing a “categorical distinction” in that regard, however, in part because, as he wrote, one
can imagine a “range of cases,” and “a clear example of distress or even necessity [ordinarily an
excuse] may be more convincing as a [CPW] than a marginal case of self-defence [ordinarily
a justification].”273 This statement is doubtless correct as far as it goes. But it risks confusing
a factual question (how evidentially persuasive is a particular defense in context?) with a question
of legal principle (how should that defense be conceived for purposes of understanding its legal
consequences (inter alia, for third parties or for the obligation vel non to pay reparations)?).
The ILC adopted Crawford’s approach, and the Articles on State Responsibility do not distinguish excuses from justifications among the CPWs. The ILC noted only that the issue
“should be discussed in the commentary.”274 But it is not. The ILC Commentary often treats
justification and excuse interchangeably. It neither discusses nor attributes significance to the
distinction between those two rubrics. At the outset of chapter V, for example, the commentary
266
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says that CPWs “do not annul or terminate the obligation; rather they provide a justification
or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in question subsists.”275 Two comments later, the commentary characterizes force majeure (Article 23) as a justification and an
excuse in the same paragraph.276
As for necessity, the ILC Commentary suggests that it should be understood as an excuse
rather than a justification, noting, for example, that Article 25 will “rarely be available to excuse
non-performance of an obligation.”277 But the footnotes introduce some ambiguity in this
regard, for they neither distinguish, nor ascribe significance to the distinction between, the
precedents charactering necessity as an excuse and those characterizing it as a justification.278
It should also be noted that Article 27 provides that invoking a CPW is “without prejudice to
. . . [t]he question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question.”279 For
unclear reasons, the ILC evidently decided that, here again, it would be prudent not to draw
a formal distinction between justification and excuse—reparations, perhaps, being the presumptive, but defeasible, obligation in the latter case.280
The Articles on State Responsibility’s decision to elide the justification/excuse fault line in
the context of CPWs is surprising. It is not, of course, a trivial linguistic issue. It may be unclear
or hard to sustain in some circumstances281 or where a valid defense is “overdetermined.”282
But the characterization of a defense as one or the other generally has significant legal implications,283 including, for example, that
[j]ustified action is warranted action; similar actions could properly be performed by others; such actions should not be interfered with by those capable of stopping them; and such
actions may be assisted by those in a position to render aid. If action is excused, the actor
is relieved of blame but others may not properly perform similar actions; interference with
such actions is appropriate; and assistance of such actions is wrongful.284
The characterization of a particular defense to state responsibility as either justification or
excuse might have comparably serious implications in general international law. Consider two
examples.
First, suppose that necessity justified NATO’s aerial bombardment of Serbia in 1999, as Belgium argued before the ICJ.285 If so, necessity rendered NATO’s acts, which violated an orthodox reading of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, legally right, not just morally “legitimate,” as
275
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some scholars and commissions of inquiry concluded.286 Justification might also have meant
that third parties (states not members of NATO) would have acted legally had they contributed
to the attack on Serbia. If necessity excused NATO’s campaign, by contrast, then NATO states
might not incur state responsibility, or the same degree of it, for their presumptive violation
of Article 2(4). But third parties would not legally be entitled to join in the attack, and the use
of force under the circumstances would remain internationally wrongful.
For international custom, among other issues,287 the excuse/justification distinction might
matter in a long-term, more legally profound sense. Excused, unlike justified, force does not
pose the same jurisprudential threat to what many scholars see as one of the “least controversial”
examples of a jus cogens norm:288 the UN Charter’s prohibition on “the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”289
Second, suppose that Argentina’s default on its sovereign debt in 2002, the largest to date,290
entitled it to invoke necessity under Article 25 and that necessity therefore justified Argentina’s
subsequent market interventions and other controversial economic measures. In that case,
Argentina’s prima facie failures to honor certain obligations vouchsafed to foreign nationals by
bilateral investment treaties were not internationally wrongful acts, and the Argentine government, having done nothing wrongful under international law, need not compensate affected
investors for their losses— ever. So concluded at least one investment tribunal.291 Yet that conclusion is at least in tension with the structure of the Articles on State Responsibility, which
provide, first, that the Articles on State Responsibility “do not apply where and to the extent
that” a lex specialis governs (BITs, according to the weight of authority, qualify in this
regard),292 and second, that a state’s invocation of a CPW “is without prejudice to . . . [t]he
question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question.”293 Consequently, here, in contrast to the former example, Article 25 (assuming, for the sake of the argument, that it applies despite the BITs) seemingly should operate as an excuse. After the state of
necessity in Argentina ceased, as it now has, Argentina’s obligation to compensate foreign
investors for past violations of the relevant BITs should revive.294
Treating necessity as a justification in this context295—that is, as a circumstance that precludes wrongfulness—therefore seems not only misguided, but at odds with how the ILC Commentary suggests that CPWs should operate. To further clarify this point, assume, contrary to
part I above, that necessity’s customary scope extends to various essential interests other than
286
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the very survival of the state. Still, in the rare case in which necessity could properly be invoked,
it would not be because exigent circumstances render the invoking state’s otherwise legally
wrongful conduct right; rather, it would be because those circumstances temporarily suspend
the invoking state’s duty to perform the obligation at issue. The invoking state must resume
compliance with that obligation (or pay reparations for damages caused by its non-observance)
once the state of necessity ceases.296
In sum, the Articles on State Responsibility and the ILC Commentary characterize necessity, like all CPWs, as a justification. It is said to preclude the wrongfulness of an otherwise
illegal act, and Sarah Heathcote, among others, understands that to mean that necessity “renders the act lawful, rather than merely excusing the actor.”297 But the foregoing examples suggest otherwise. At a minimum, they suggest that the effects of necessity may differ contextually.
That is unsurprising. As stressed, general international law lacks the conceptual and institutional features of a legal system that could render the choice-of-evils paradigm of justified necessity feasible. Article 25 invites confusion, and perhaps abuse, insofar as it reorients necessity to
be a plea that, in practice, requires comparative analysis of the essential interests of states and,
at times, “the international community as a whole.”298
From the “Very Survival” of a State to Its “Essential Interests”
After all, what is an “essential interest”? The law of nations recognized only existential threats
as grounds for a necessity plea. Article 25 expands the scope of necessity by extending it, potentially, to any state conduct taken “to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
peril.”299 The ILC Commentary declines to define “essential interest,” stressing that its meaning “depends on all the circumstances, and cannot be prejudged.”300 That is surely correct and
prudently stated. But at a bare minimum, it seems clear that the essential interests cognizable
under Article 25 include more than the (sovereign) existential interests recognized by classical
international law. Heathcote says that what qualifies as “an essential interest is not a fixed category,” but she opines further that it “is not limited to safeguarding the very survival of the State
itself. It includes, notably, the preservation of the natural environment or the ecological equilibrium, the economic survival of the State, and the maintenance of the food supply of the population.”301
This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. Untethered from its pedigree as an existential limit
on the force of obligations under the law of nations, there is no obvious way to limit a state’s
discretion to characterize certain interests as essential for purposes of Article 25.302 Special Rapporteur Crawford recognized the history of abuses carried out under the pretext of necessity.303
296
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But he concluded that “concerns as to the possible abuse of necessity are not borne out by experience.”304 For Article 25, this statement raises an empirical question that probably cannot be
answered after only a decade. It is reasonable to worry, however, that Article 25 might incentivize states to characterize interests as essential in circumstances in which international obligations impose more serious hardships than anticipated, prove politically unpopular, or perhaps simply turn out to be inconvenient. Already, in fact, Francisco Orrego Vicuña laments
the “softening” of necessity, observing with reference to international investment jurisprudence:
If the threshold is lowered to the extent that recent decisions have suggested[,] one may
wonder whether a state of necessity may not be invoked by the United States in view of
a major financial crisis, the United Kingdom in the light of its GDP having fallen to levels
comparable to the postwar years, or Spain for having unemployment reaching a third of
its work force.305
Current and future crises—fiscal, ecological, military, epidemiological, and otherwise—will
doubtless shape the protean concept of an essential interest in the years to come. Much will
depend on how Article 25 is construed and enforced. As Orrego Vicuña suggests, however,
experience to date in investor-state arbitration provides some cause for concern.
Normative Hierarchy and Dissonance
Assume that a state concludes that it must breach an international obligation because breach
is, or seems to be, the only way to safeguard an essential interest of that state against a grave and
imminent peril under Article 25(1)(a). Article 25(1)(b) asks whether that breach will “seriously
impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or
of the international community as a whole.”306 If the answer to this question is yes, the plea
will be unavailing. In effect, whatever the intent of the drafters, Article 25 thereby introduces a balancing test into the law of state responsibility that resembles the choice-of-evils
paradigm.
No such test existed in the classical law of nations—for good reason. As a rule, if a state
regards the observance of an international obligation as a threat to its survival, it is unrealistic
to expect that state to consider whether its breach might impair essential interests of another
state or states or of the amorphous international community as a whole—and then potentially
to modify its conduct on that basis. By reorienting the predicate for a necessity plea from selfpreservation to (undefined) essential interests, Article 25 makes it theoretically possible for a
state to engage in a balancing test of that sort, but does not make it much, if at all, more likely.
Surely, it would be quixotic to imagine a state concluding that it must violate an international
obligation as the sole means “to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
304
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peril”— only to conclude, upon further reflection, that it will nonetheless forebear from the
violation because it would “seriously impair an essential interest of ” another state or the international community as a whole.307
Even if Article 25 is understood only as a decision rule for officials (rather than a conduct
rule for state actors), a balancing analysis of this sort remains as impracticable as it is abstruse.
Within national legal systems, legislatures, ex ante, and courts or juries, ex post, can regulate
choices among evils and enforce the polity’s will in that regard. But beyond the context of (the
bare handful of ) jus cogens norms or a self-contained treaty regime or other lex specialis, comparably strong institutions and norms of general international law seldom exist or enjoy the
requisite efficacy and legitimacy to serve an analogous role. Heathcote observes to similar effect
that one “problem of transposibility is the lack of compulsory jurisdiction at the international
level which would ‘objectivize’ through impartial adjudication any invocation of the necessity
plea.”308 Indeed, even if an impartial tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction or a cognate institution were in place, it remains unclear how—that is, on the basis of what standards—such an
institution should balance the essential interests of states against one another or the international community as a whole. In short, especially in the event of incommensurable social values
or interests, one state’s safeguarded essential interest will often be another’s seriously impaired
essential interest.
Contribution
Article 25(2) precludes necessity if the “State has contributed to the situation.”309 In
national law, both justified and excused necessity embrace a similar concept of contribution
(based on intuitions about culpable fault), which may limit or exclude the defense entirely.
Within a compulsory judicial system, it is feasible to develop a jurisprudence that distinguishes
degrees of fault and that establishes a threshold beyond which the necessity defense is disallowed or only partially allowed.310 In the law of state responsibility, however, it will be
the rare case in which the invoking state has not contributed to the situation to some extent.
But because functionally analogous legal institutions to those in national law seldom exist in
general international law (for example, a hierarchical court system that can, over time, define
and refine a sophisticated jurisprudence distinguishing different kinds and degrees of contribution), it is not obvious how we should understand contribution under Article 25(2). For
example, does it refer to conduct, as it does in some national legal systems, or to fault, as it does
in others?
The travaux offer some guidance. Commenting on an earlier draft, Ago had taken the
extreme position that the peril must be “entirely beyond the control of the State whose interest
is threatened.”311 If that is correct, even a de minimis contribution by the invoking state would
categorically exclude the plea. Such a high threshold is not only facially unreasonable but also
inconsistent with the distinction drawn by the Articles on State Responsibility between force
307
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majeure and necessity. The former applies to an “irresistible force,”312 typically a natural disaster, that lies wholly beyond the state’s control, whereas necessity clearly involves a choice on
the part of the invoking state: “In the case of force majeure, respecting the obligation is absolutely impossible, whereas in the case of necessity, the impossibility is relative: a choice is made
between suffering the grave and imminent peril and violating an obligation protecting an interest of lesser importance.”313 If that choice alone qualified as a contribution sufficient to exclude
the plea, necessity could never be availing.
Under Crawford’s guidance, the ILC changed the cognate contribution exclusions in Articles 23 (force majeure) and 24 (distress) to read “due, either alone or in combination with other
factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it.”314 But the ILC preserved the simpler phrase
“has contributed” in Article 25 because “necessity needs to be more narrowly confined.”315 In
comparative terms, the nature, type, or extent of contribution that precludes necessity is therefore lower than for distress or force majeure. The ILC Commentary adds that the contribution
“must be sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral,”316 but this abstract
statement offers little additional guidance.
Consider again the viability of Argentina’s necessity plea in the more than forty investment
arbitrations brought against it in the past decade. Doubtless Argentina’s fiscal and monetary
policies in the 1990s contributed to its crisis in 2001– 02.317 But were its policies merely incidental or peripheral to its default on its sovereign debt? Should Argentina, based on contribution, be precluded from invoking necessity? Perhaps. Tribunals differ on this issue. The
point of emphasis is simply that in appraising degrees of fault in national law, the existence and
operation of precedent, a hierarchical judiciary, and stare decisis help to refine and clarify the
standard of contribution, whereas in the general law of state responsibility, the comparative
absence of analogous institutions often makes it difficult to ascertain objectively the extent to
which an invoking state’s greater or lesser degree of contribution to the situation should preclude its plea of necessity. The complexity and sheer number of potentially relevant factors
involved in such an analysis is daunting.318
Also reconsider NATO’s aerial campaign against Serbia. However critical humanitarian
intervention might have seemed to NATO states at the time, it is arguable, and several scholars
across the ideological spectrum have argued, that many NATO states contributed to the situation in Kosovo through nearly a decade of inept policies in response to the breakup of the
former Yugoslavia.319 Assuming that the contribution of these states qualifies as substantial and
not merely incidental or peripheral, does their contribution preclude intervention? Should it?
What if belated intervention would nonetheless save thousands of lives and prevent serious,
widespread human rights atrocities? Might the exclusion for contribution lead to the absurd
result that “necessity could not be invoked to safeguard the life of the population because the
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State itself contributed to the situation”?320 We need to know both (1) the degree and kind of
contribution that triggers the Article 25(2)(b) exclusion and, to speak anthropomorphically,
(2) the state’s mens rea relative to the contribution—assuming that Article 25(2)(b) refers to
fault rather than conduct only.
Conclusion
It would be reasonable to ask how much law matters in circumstances of crisis, and consequently, why Article 25’s deviation from classical necessity should trouble us, if it does. International law is often said to be less effective or ineffective in circumstances of crisis, “in the
crunch, when it really hurts.”321 And that is precisely the context in which states may be
expected to invoke necessity. As Louis Henkin stressed, however, even while conceding some
force to the hackneyed critique of international law’s efficacy in crisis, “the implications are less
devastating than might appear, since a nation’s perception of ‘when it really hurts’ to observe
law must take into account its interests in law and in its observance, and the costs of violation.”322 Article 25 must be understood with these observations in mind. As putative law, it
is a variable in the decision process. It may or may not matter, and to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on a host of contextual factors. Empirically, however, it is noteworthy that the available precedents suggest that necessity has been raised about as frequently in the past three
decades as it had been in the preceding three centuries. It would, of course, be a vast overstatement to imply that the Articles on State Responsibility alone account for this. But it is not
unreasonable to think that Article 25, by supplying an apparently authoritative textual basis
and definition that expand the nature and scope of necessity, might facilitate or encourage its
invocation, even in scenarios in which reliance upon it may be inappropriate by reference to
the Articles on State Responsibility themselves.
IV. PRIMARY RULES, SECONDARY RULES, AND LEX SPECIALIS
The Articles on State Responsibility were published in 2001. Earlier drafts circulated in the
1990s and influenced international institutions; witness, for example, the ICJ’s citation of draft
Article 33 in 1997.323 It is probably not entirely coincidental that the growing prominence of
necessity as a general defense to state responsibility in international law corresponds roughly
to the past two decades. During the same time, international law has also seen an increase in
primary-rule conceptions of necessity—as evidenced, for example, by a recent academic conference that examined diverse conceptions of necessity in international law.324 Before
turning to examples that illustrate Article 25’s influence and application to date, two additional features of the Articles on State Responsibility merit analysis: first, the foundational
distinction between primary and secondary rules, and second, Article 55’s lex specialis
exclusion.
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Primary Rules and Secondary Rules
The primary/secondary rule distinction is “the central organizing idea” of the Articles
on State Responsibility.325 This language might, at first blush, be thought to refer to the
jurisprudential distinction drawn by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law. Every legal system, he famously argued, consists in the union of primary rules of obligation and secondary rules, which “specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.”326 But despite some similarities, the primary/secondary rule distinction in
Hart’s magnum opus is not the one that the drafters of the Articles on State Responsibility had
in mind.
The distinction rather originated in a “quasi-political consideration”—in particular, the
need for “a way out of the impasse” created by Garciá Amador’s initial focus on codifying the
substantive rules of diplomatic protection.327 In 1963, Ago, who succeeded Garciá Amador as
special rapporteur, recognized the futility of this task. In response, he introduced the primary/
secondary rule distinction and thereby fundamentally recast the ILC’s work on state responsibility.328 “By divorcing the Commission’s work from debates over the primary rules of international obligation, Ago allowed the ILC to elaborate ‘lawyers’ law,’ which with a few
exceptions was not threatening to states.”329 In the lexicon of the Articles on State Responsibility, primary rules establish “the content and the duration of substantive State obligations,”
which often implicate issues of long-standing controversy, whereas secondary rules aspire to
establish a uniform (and, relative to the breach of a primary rule, conceptually and temporally
subsequent) framework to govern “the consequences of a breach of an applicable primary obligation.”330 That said, and even though the distinction is indeed “indispensable”331 to the Articles on State Responsibility, it remains for the most part a distinction of expedience rather than
principle. As such, it is subject to forceful criticisms of which the ultimate appliers of the law
of state responsibility should remain mindful.332
First, the status of a rule as primary or secondary is often ambiguous.333 Consider the obligation to compensate for expropriation.334 Compensation may at first look like a primary rule
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because it is a “condition of the lawfulness of [the] act.”335 If a state takes property for a public
purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and after affording the expropriated actor due process
of law and paying appropriate compensation, it does not act wrongfully in the first place. It has
not breached any primary rule of international law. If that state refuses to compensate the
expropriated actor, however, it violates the primary rule that conditions a lawful expropriation
on, among other criteria, payment of appropriate compensation. Yet, with equal accuracy, one
may characterize the state’s obligation to compensate, in the latter case, as a consequence of the
wrongful expropriation. The expropriating state’s failure to pay compensation breached a primary rule, rendering the state’s obligation to compensate (now) a secondary rule.
Similarly, consider self-defense (Article 21). It precludes the wrongfulness of an otherwise
unlawful recourse to force. So characterized, it operates as a secondary rule. But the same rule
may, with equal logic and precision, be characterized as a primary rule. Bona fide self-defense
does not violate the jus ad bellum, the relevant primary rules, in the first place.336 The same goes
for consent (Article 20): it precludes responsibility for an otherwise unlawful act (such as a
cross-border incursion) and, in this regard, operates as a secondary rule. But because consent
would vitiate the wrongfulness of the incursion in the first place, “the question of responsibility
[would] not arise,”337 and consent could properly be viewed as a primary rule. These examples
illustrate why, as Eric David has argued, “If there is a particular field in which the existence of
autonomous secondary rules can give rise to discussion, it is in the field of the circumstances
precluding wrongfulness.”338
Second, the distinction is sometimes just too simple. Its dualistic quality fails to capture the
rich complexity of certain norms of international law, as in the case of those that operate on
both the primary and secondary levels.339 For example,
if a state violates a rule of diplomatic law versus another state, which is a violation of a primary rule, the latter state will be entitled to respond and to resort to countermeasures,
which is a secondary rule. However, it may not react in kind since diplomatic law is
excluded from the realm of countermeasures under Art 50(2)(b) of the [Articles on State
Responsibility], which reflects the dictum of the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages case. This indicates that the rules on diplomatic and consular relations operate both on the primary and
on the secondary level.340
Third, as we will see in the context of investment arbitration, problems sometimes arise in
practice because the nature of primary/secondary rule interaction is complex and variable. In
particular, relative to a set of primary rules with its own necessity component (for example, the
jus ad bellum or the jus in bello), it may not be clear whether Article 25, as a secondary rule, (1)
supplements that primary rule, (2) informs its interpretation, or (3) displaces it. Much depends
on whether the regime at issue should be characterized as a lex specialis under Article 55 of the
Articles on State Responsibility.
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While acknowledging these complexities, Special Rapporteur Crawford stressed that “it is
far from clear what other principle of organization might be adopted,” and observed that “the
distinction has a number of advantages”341 That is doubtless true. Yet the quintessentially functional rationale for the distinction must nonetheless be borne in mind, for, over time, decision
makers can lose sight of the origins of, or rationale for, conventional distinctions, and the prudence and care that should attend their use may decline commensurately.
The Scope of Article 55 (Lex Specialis)
A second critical qualification to the application of Article 25 is Article 55 (lex specialis),
which says that the Articles on State Responsibility “do not apply where and to the extent that
the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international
law.”342 Perhaps the clearest example of a lex specialis is international trade law under the
W TO/GATT regime.343 This network of treaties governing international trade constitutes a
sophisticated body of law and includes an effective, compulsory dispute resolution process.
Dispute panels initially adjudicate disputes, and their decisions may be reviewed by the Appellate Body. The reports of the panels and Appellate Body have binding precedential effect
insofar as they are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body. The whole system benefits from
efficacious sanctions in the form of remedies that the Dispute Settlement Body approves—typically increased tariffs, which prevailing states may implement if the violating state does not
take appropriate measures to correct the violation. W TO/GATT law also clearly defines the
circumstances under which necessity constitutes a defense. Taken together, the panel and
Appellate Body reports contribute to an evolving jurisprudence on necessity that is refined over
time by a method approximating that of the common law.344
W TO/GATT law typifies a “strong” lex specialis, one of international law’s “self-contained
regime[s].”345 According to the ILC Commentary, however, Article 55 should also be understood to encompass “weaker” regimes—for example, “a specific treaty provision” that preempts one article of the Articles on State Responsibility but leaves others untouched.346 Furthermore, as a general matter, except for jus cogens norms, the default presumption is that states
may, by consent, displace the Articles on State Responsibility with a lex specialis if they
341
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choose.347 To infer a lex specialis, however, it does not suffice that special rules cover the same
subject matter as the Articles on State Responsibility; “there must be some actual inconsistency
between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other.”348 In
this regard, the ILC Commentary specifically contemplates that a treaty, such as a BIT, might
render Article 25 inapplicable as between the states parties.349 The same is true of international
humanitarian law treaties in which, according to the commentary,
certain humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict expressly exclude reliance
on military necessity. Others while not explicitly excluding necessity are intended to apply
in abnormal situations of peril for the responsible State and plainly engage its essential
interests. In such a case the non-availability of the plea of necessity emerges clearly from the
object and the purpose of the rule.350
For similar reasons, Article 25 should not apply to the jus ad bellum. The ILC Commentary
emphasizes that “while considerations akin to those underlying article 25 may have a role, they
are taken into account in the context of the formulation and interpretation of the primary obligations” relating to substantive rules of the law of war and neutrality, as well as certain rules of
international humanitarian law.351 In short, Article 25 should not apply if the applicable primary rules already take into account its raison d’être.
Yet at times in the past two decades, international law has witnessed the incongruous application of necessity as a secondary rule—applied either in conjunction with, or as an additional
layer of legal analysis grafted onto, primary rules that incorporate or deliberately displace Article 25. Given Article 55, the simultaneous or sequential application of Article 25 seems misguided in these fields. Illustrative examples from two fields—war and investment—will be considered below. They offer a sense of how Article 25 might function in the future. The examples
also reflect potential problems created by Article 25’s adoption of a definition of necessity that,
while prudently and carefully qualified, expands both the scope and nature of the defense.
Necessity and War: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello
Arguing before the ICJ in a case ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Belgium
advanced necessity as a defense to state responsibility for its participation in NATO’s 1999 aerial campaign against Serbia. At the time, NATO sought to prevent Serb forces from carrying
out atrocities against Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority. Whatever the moral merits of
NATO’s campaign, many scholars have argued that it violated the jus ad bellum.352 Rusen
Ergec, counsel for Belgium, conceded that NATO’s assault would ordinarily violate Article
347
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2(4) of the UN Charter. But in a clear echo of Article 25, he argued that under the exigent circumstances of humanitarian crisis, necessity “justifies the violation of a binding rule in order
to safeguard, in [the] face of grave and imminent peril, values which are higher than those protected by the rule which has been breached.”353 He reasoned, in other words, that the UN
Charter’s general prohibition on force,354 the “binding rule,” should yield to the moral imperative to prevent serious human rights atrocities, which Ergec characterized as implicating higher
values of the international legal system.355
In the context of the Articles on State Responsibility, this argument has a facial plausibility—
quite apart from its ethical appeal and humanitarian rationale. As argued above, despite the
perils of the national law analogy, Article 25 lends itself, in practice, to precisely the kind of
variation on a choice-of-evils analysis that Belgium proposed vis-à-vis the Kosovo campaign.
While perhaps understandable in this context, that analysis remains, for the reasons set forth
earlier, problematic generally in the international legal sphere and, for two additional reasons,
even more troubling in this particular context.
First, the ILC Commentary implies that the law governing recourse to force (the jus ad bellum), which has its own necessity standard, implicitly excludes Article 25; “considerations akin
to those underlying article 25 . . . are taken into account in the context of the formulation and
interpretation of the primary obligations.”356 In fact, the ILC Commentary expressly disavows
the proposal substantively advanced by counsel for Belgium—namely, that Article 25 should
be used to resolve the “question whether measures of forcible humanitarian intervention” not
authorized by the Security Council “may be lawful under modern international law.”357
Second, while NATO’s conduct may have been legitimate despite its facial violation of the
UN Charter, Ergec’s invocation of necessity as the legal concept to vindicate this judgment may
well be misguided. Many international lawyers regard Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, far from
being the lesser value in Ergec’s characterization, as the paradigm of a jus cogens norm, one of
the “least controversial examples.”358 It is not at all obvious that in the absence of Security
Council authorization, humanitarian intervention by NATO qualifies as the “higher” value
vis-à-vis the jus cogens norm codified by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Even in a context that
may well strike some as a laudable example of how Article 25’s progressive definition of necessity might, and perhaps should, operate, international law does not readily lend itself to the
choice-of-evils paradigm. This problem is especially acute where, as here, the paradigm would
require decision makers not only to weigh incommensurable values but to do so in the absence
of consensus on a normative hierarchy among the critical, perhaps equally salient values at stake
in this example. To put the point in concrete terms, both the categorical prohibition on crimes
against humanity and UN Charter Article 2(4) qualify as jus cogens norms, but their importance
does not lie along a common measure.359 The former reflects the vital postwar commitment
353
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to preventing serious human rights atrocities, whereas the latter reflects the equally vital postwar commitment to abolishing unilateral resort to force by states except in self-defense or under
UN auspices. Without further, and surely controversial, analysis, neither can be said to be obviously more important than the other. Each involves a jus cogens norm, and Article 26 of the
Articles on State Responsibility prohibits invoking one of the CPWs to “preclude[] the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a
peremptory norm of general international law.”360
Several years prior to Belgium’s argument before the ICJ, and also in the context of the jus
ad bellum, the ICJ arguably invoked a similar choice-of-evils definition of necessity sua sponte.
The meaning of the ICJ’s infamous dispositif in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion remains
debatable. But the technical majority said that although “the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the” jus in bello, their use might still be lawful “in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”361 Based
on this language, it seems likely that this portion of the ICJ’s dispositif—which, as Judge Higgins observed, went beyond anything any state argued to the ICJ362— originated in the lingering influence of classical necessity, with its focus on the supposedly natural right of states
to do anything necessary to their very survival as states.
It seems anachronistic for the ICJ to transpose classical necessity from an era in which no
jus ad bellum existed to an era not only in which it exists, but in which its centerpiece—the
general prohibition on the threat or use of force in international affairs—is generally thought
to be the paradigm of a jus cogens norm. The ILC Commentary describes the jus ad bellum and
the jus in bello alike as areas of the law that already “tak[e] into account [‘considerations akin
to those underlying article 25’] in the context of the formulation and interpretation of the primary obligations.”363 Surely, this statement seriously calls into question the ICJ’s tacit Article
25 reasoning, which is implicit in the quoted portion of the dispositif—in particular, that, as
between the very survival of a state and respect for the jus in bello, the former might take precedence over the latter in circumstances that threaten the state’s “very survival.” The ICJ nonetheless incongruously grafted this conception of necessity onto its earlier conclusion that
nuclear weapons inherently violate the jus in bello. This analytic process or methodology led
to a holding that many international lawyers regard as theoretically confused and regressive in
the context of the global effort to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.
More recently, in the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ, after finding that Israel’s construction
of a wall in the West Bank violated the jus ad bellum for a variety of reasons, considered sua
sponte “whether Israel could rely on a state of necessity [as defined in Article 25] which would
preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall.”364 Again, the ICJ’s analysis is in
tension with the Articles on State Responsibility and the ILC Commentary, which cautions:
“As embodied in article 25, the plea of necessity is not intended to cover conduct which is in
principle regulated by the primary obligations,” a chief example of which, according to the
360
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commentary, is “the rules relating to the use of force in international relations.”365 Ignoring
this admonition, the ICJ considered whether an act not justified by military necessity could still
be permitted under a state of necessity as defined in the law of state responsibility. In other
words, as Gabriella Venturini aptly put the question:
Might necessity justify under the law of peace acts that military necessity would not allow
under the law of armed conflict? Although the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Opinion and Wall
Opinion seem to point in that direction, this reading would seriously hamper the observance of [the law of armed conflict] based on the principle of equality of belligerents, and
it is clearly contrary to the wording and authoritative interpretation of Article 25 of the ILC
Draft Articles.366
Given that no party had advanced this misguided view, the ICJ, referring to Article 25,
unsurprisingly found itself “not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route
chosen [is] the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has
invoked as justification for that construction.”367 But in the long term, the factual finding
expressed in this statement, however questionable its evidentiary basis,368 may well be less troubling than its legal implication, which is broadly consistent with the ICJ’s suggestion in the
Nuclear Weapons opinion: that a general (secondary) rule of necessity may authorize a state to
engage in hostilities even if those hostilities violate the independent necessity standard of the
jus ad bellum. To put the point simply, the ICJ opinions suggest that in certain contexts, Article
25 effectively gives states “two bites at the apple” of necessity.
Necessity and Investment: Modern Investor-State Arbitration
Many of the cited precedents for a general necessity defense in the law of state responsibility
involve claims of economic necessity, although, historically, these claims have never prevailed.369 The predominance of such defenses in international law is in one sense ironic, for
national laws tend to exclude economic necessity defenses categorically.370 It also highlights
again the dangers in transposing concepts from national to international law. But foreign
investment law and arbitration is doubtless the most visible area in which necessity has drawn
renewed international attention in the past decade, and I would be remiss to disregard it. That
said, I want to stress that the point of this section is not so much to contribute to the already
365
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vast literature on necessity in investment arbitration.371 It is to indicate how Article 25— despite the ILC’s prudent efforts to limit its ambit by, inter alia, defining the necessity defense
in the negative, establishing a high threshold for its invocation, and subjecting it to apparently
strict preconditions— has already (in foreign investment law, as in the laws of war) started to
shape international law, not necessarily for the better.
In a series of investment disputes, almost all arising out of Argentina’s conduct following its
sovereign debt default, necessity has been advanced as a defense to alleged BIT violations.
Argentina has variously framed necessity either as a general or customary principle of the law
of state responsibility or as a particular interpretation of the governing arbitral law set forth in
the relevant BIT, often Article XI of the U.S.-Argentine BIT:372 “This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” As of this writing,
some twenty awards and annulment decisions have considered necessity in this context.373
Argentina’s success has been mixed, and the evolving jurisprudence, both inconsistent and
confused.374 Jürgen Kurtz observes that most awards reflect one of three methodologies for
applying Article 25 in the context of the relevant BITs.375
Kurtz refers to the first approach, which is predominant, especially in the earlier awards, as
confluence.376 But he means something stronger than that: not just confluence, but conflation
of Article 25 with Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT (or cognate articles of other BITs).
These awards “expressly conflate the treaty defence with the customary plea of necessity,” and
Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility accordingly is interpreted as offering guidance
that informs the meaning of BIT Article XI.377 This interpretation of Article XI is puzzling for
several reasons,378 not all of which can be pursued here. But from the perspective of the Articles
on State Responsibility, note, in the first place, that the BIT preceded the Articles on State
Responsibility by more than a decade. It is unlikely that the BIT’s drafters had in mind a conception of necessity that is substantively identical to that of Article 25. Second, recall that the
assumption that Article 25 codifies customary international law, a sine qua non of the confluence approach, is mistaken or at best questionable.
371
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That said, the confluence approach is hardly unique in this regard. Most, if not all, of the
tribunals faced with Argentina’s necessity plea have followed the ICJ in assuming that Article
25 codifies custom.379 The confluence approach, however, also perforce rejects the proposition
that either the BIT, in general, or Article XI, in particular, qualifies as a lex specialis within the
meaning of Article 55 of the Articles on State Responsibility—for otherwise Article 25 would
be displaced and therefore inapplicable. Yet the parties to BITs enter into them precisely
because they wish to modify, displace, or augment the customary international law that would
otherwise govern investment in each state vis-à-vis each other’s nationals. The ILC Commentary provides that for “the lex specialis principle to apply . . . [,] there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the
other,”380 but the inconsistency need not, of course, be explicit.
Furthermore, the host state’s treaty obligation to compensate foreign investors for violations
of the BIT, in combination with the deliberate incentives that this obligation creates in connection with standards of treatment vouchsafed to those investors, is an indispensable means
by which the paramount objective of the BIT—“to promote greater economic cooperation
between [the states parties]”381—is to be realized. Article XI, accordingly, says nothing about
vitiating the host state’s obligation to compensate under exigent circumstances. Nor does it
expressly exempt the parties from responsibility for measures taken under Article XI; and given
the nature of the BIT, one would have expected clear language to that effect had the drafters
so intended. Article XI, on its face, simply affirms that neither state party relinquishes its sovereign right and, indeed, obligation to preserve peace and minimum order. A state may nonetheless be exempt from the obligation to pay BIT-qualified investors compensation for
unavoidable natural disasters under Article 23 (force majeure), for investors assume such ordinary business risks unless a contract or other investment instrument provides otherwise. But
the same cannot be said of measures taken by the state, which, by definition, involve a deliberate
choice.382
Finally, the scope of Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not coterminous with that of
Article 25. The former’s reference to “measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests”383 could be more or
less restrictive than Article 25’s comparatively vague reference to an “essential interest.”384 Yet
the methodology of confluence may nonetheless render Article XI superfluous, “violat[ing] the
principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation.”385
In short, the confluence approach illustrates one risk of codifying necessity in Article 25 as
a general secondary defense to state responsibility: it may be (as it has been) incorporated by
379
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tribunals into complex legal arrangements to which it (probably) should not apply. Contrary
to Article 55, the confluence approach superimposes Article 25 upon a lex specialis. In fact, Article 25 has, at times, even been treated as hierarchically superior to the ordinary meaning of the
governing BIT’s text. This treatment of Article 25 may be understandable, which is not to say
justifiable, because an apparently authoritative text can greatly facilitate a tribunal’s analysis.
But it can lead, in effect, to the application of Article 25 as a primary rather than a secondary
rule—as before, assuming for the sake of the argument that Article 25 applies in this context
despite Article 55’s clear exclusion of the Articles on State Responsibility in circumstances in
which a lex specialis governs. To illustrate the problems more concretely, consider one example,
LG&E v. Argentina.386
LG&E, like most of the arbitrations arising out of Argentina’s financial crisis, took place
under the auspices of the ICSID Convention,387 Article 42(1) of which provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law
of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws)
and such rules of international law as may be applicable.388
Applying this article to the dispute between the claimant, a U.S. national, and the respondent,
Argentina, the BIT between Argentina and the United States sets forth the “rules of law . . .
agreed by the parties.”389 The BIT, in turn, includes Article XI, which confirms that nothing
in the BIT should be understood to prevent the parties from taking the measures that they
regard as necessary to maintain public order, international peace or security, and their “own
essential security interests.390
LG&E illustrates the confusion caused by applying Article 25 to a situation controlled by
a superseding lex specialis—in this case, the U.S.-Argentina BIT. In its decision on liability, the
tribunal found as a matter of fact that “from 1 December 2001 until 26 April 2003, Argentina
was in a period of crisis during which it was necessary to enact measures to maintain public
order and protect its essential security interests.”391 While debatable, this finding of fact is
surely reasonable, and Article XI makes clear that the BIT does not preclude Argentina from
taking the measures it deems necessary to maintain public order domestically or to protect its
essential security interests. The problem in LG&E rather lies in the legal conclusion that the
tribunal draws from this finding of fact. In particular, it concluded, with the dubious interpretive aid of Article 25,392 that during the cited time period, “Argentina is excused under Article XI from liability for any breaches of the [BIT]” and, furthermore, that Article XI “exempts
Argentina of responsibility for measures enacted during the state of necessity.”393
As a matter of law, what the tribunal has done here is breathtaking— both for its conclusion
and for the methodology by which the tribunal arrived at it. The first and elementary rule of
386

LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 135.
ICSID Convention, supra note 3.
388
Id., Art. 42(1).
389
Id.
390
U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 292, Art. XI.
391
LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 135, para. 226.
392
See id., paras. 249 – 61.
393
Id., paras. 229, 257 (emphasis added).
387

2012]

ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF NECESSITY IN THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY

501

treaty interpretation is that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”394 Nothing in Article XI’s text expresses or implies that it excuses the host
state from liability, or exempts it from responsibility, for measures taken under this provision.
It is only by a leap of interpretive logic, enabled by the tribunal’s misplaced reliance on Article
25 of the Articles on State Responsibility to inform its interpretation of Article XI of the BIT,
that the tribunal arrived at the conclusion that Article XI vitiates any treaty-based right of the
investor to compensation for losses sustained during the period specified. Rather than look to
the context and the object and purpose of the BIT, as embodied in the preamble (for example,
to establish standards for “the treatment to be accorded . . . investment” in order to “stimulate
the flow of private capital” and “to maintain a stable framework for” the “reciprocal protection
of investment”),395 the LG&E panel reached beyond the treaty. In particular, it interpreted
Article XI of the BIT as incorporating Article 25—a secondary rule, which, according to the ILC
Commentary, applies only in the event of a breach of a primary rule and which, in any event,
constitutes progressive development that did not even exist at the time of the BIT’s ratification.
In other words, the tribunal retrospectively imported into its analysis an innovative rule of
necessity from the law of state responsibility—a rule that neither state party could have had in
mind during the negotiations culminating in the BIT. It did so even though Article 25, according to the Articles on State Responsibility, is both “without prejudice to . . . [t]he question of
compensation for any material loss caused by the [wrongful] act in question”396 and inapplicable “where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.”397 As between the states parties and their nationals,
the BIT supplies those special rules. Consequently, while Argentina doubtless had the right to
take measures to preserve its security and order (which Article XI of the BIT makes clear the
treaty does not purport to preclude), that should not necessarily have affected its responsibility
or consequent liability to pay reparations for violations of standards vouchsafed by the BIT
once the conditions of economic crisis had passed, as they have.398
Since LG&E and a somewhat similar analysis of Article XI in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Argentina,399 several further tribunals and ICSID annulment committees have analyzed the
relationship between Article 25 and Article XI of the BIT. Some have reached comparable, and
others contrary, conclusions.400 To be clear, I do not mean to impugn any of these complex
394
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decisions, on which reasonable minds can surely differ. The literature on necessity in investment arbitration is rich and complex, and although my sympathies on some of the legal issues
will doubtless be apparent from this discussion, it has not been my objective here to fully defend
a position or to blithely dismiss contrary perspectives. Instead, I mean to point out and emphasize a concern about Article 25’s influence to date, which the jurisprudential dispute over Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and Article 25 in the context of the Argentine fiscal crisis aptly
illustrates: beneath the veneer of technical legal craft in these awards lies a normative dispute
about the relative priority of diverse social interests and values. It is these differences, and not
the surface of positive legal analysis, that explains the divergent views reached by most of the
tribunals and annulment committees that have considered the issue of necessity. The awards
illustrate, in other words, a chief problem inherent in Article 25’s establishment of a necessity
standard redolent of the choice-of-evils paradigm. That paradigm has, to a certain extent, been
imported by Article 25 into a legal order that lacks both the institutions needed to weigh (often
incommensurable) interests and values against one another and the comparatively high degree
of normative consensus on the relative priority of diverse values, policies, and interests that it
also requires.
Conclusion
The ILC went out of its way to stress the exceptional nature of necessity. But general international law lacks analogues to the national legal institutions that can authoritatively answer
the difficult questions that necessity raises in any legal system. Were it plausible to expect states
to construe the plea exactingly, this lack of analogues might not be cause for concern. Ago once
said that for necessity to be availing, “it must be impossible for the peril to be averted by any other
means, even one which is much more onerous but which can be adopted without a breach of
international obligations.”401 But both conceptually and in practice, that view would render
necessity, for all intents and purposes, nugatory. Neither states nor tribunals (or other decision
makers) will be likely to construe Article 25 so stringently. The real cause for concern is to the
contrary: in practice and over time, the de facto threshold for necessity will atrophy or
“soften”402 The evidence to date suggests that the mere existence of the ILC codification of
necessity in the Articles on State Responsibility encourages states and tribunals to raise the plea,
often in circumstances in which compliance with an obligation may be painful or inconvenient, to be sure, but perhaps not necessary in the genuinely exigent sense intended by the ILC.
What should be the rare exception increasingly becomes less so, and the high threshold established in the Articles on State Responsibility tends to atrophy over time through an evolutionary process of assertion, adjudication, and interpretation.403
V. CONCLUSION: CONTEXTUALIZING AND HUMANIZING NECESSITY
Because of the exponential increase in treaties and other codified law in the postwar era, the
content, validity, and interpretation of Article 25 as a putative customary defense of necessity
may affect the stability and operation of regimes beyond those contemplated or in ways not
401
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envisioned. Were we writing on a blank slate, it might be prudent not to codify necessity as a
general defense to state responsibility in the nature of a secondary rule. It might be more prudent to leave it to states to shape necessity contextually as a primary rule to meet their particular
mutual interests in different areas of the law. That is, in fact, what has happened in many fields
of contemporary international law.
The codification of a rule tends to legitimize it. Necessity is, in this regard, like torture,
which, not coincidentally, it has been invoked to defend. To pursue the analogy a bit further,
one might acknowledge that in certain crises, officials will torture, whatever the law says. But
it remains, of course, a distinct question whether recognition of this fact commends the codification or overt regulation of torture.404
Similarly, in certain crises, states will almost surely invoke necessity to defend their failure
to adhere to an international legal obligation, whatever international law says. Article 25, like
any general definition of necessity, is, and can be, at most a variable in this regard, the strength
of which will vary contextually. But once positive law codifies an exception for the exceptional,
it tends to become less so over time. By establishing criteria for invoking necessity, Article 25
might facilitate its invocation rather than limit it—for the invoking state can assert its technical
observance of the criteria in putative satisfaction of its legal obligations. Tribunals, as some ICJ
judgments and arbitral awards illustrate, rapidly tend to adopt codifications verbatim rather
than consider them as one source of evidence.405
That said, we do not write on a blank slate. As Ago said, necessity may well be “far too deeply
rooted in the consciousness of the members of the international community . . . . If driven out
of the door it would return through the window, if need be in other forms.”406 If so, the relevant
question now is how it should be reconceived and applied in contemporary international law.
I want to conclude with several reflections on this question.
Rethinking the plea of necessity in the twenty-first century requires attention to, among
other factors, its contemporary normative rationale, the contextually available international
institutions and their efficacy, the degree of normative consensus that might more readily
enable a necessity plea in different areas of international law, and the diversity of factual circumstances in which necessity might foreseeably be invoked. A comprehensive consideration
of these issues would require a book.407 Still, it may be feasible at least to set out some core
changes to the plea that postwar developments in international law commend.
First, normatively, insofar as classical necessity remains custom, it must be tempered by the recognition that contemporary international law—at least in theory and certainly as progressive development—no longer privileges the state’s preservation for the state’s sake. Rather, “Considered in
both its municipal aspect and in its international aspect, a state’s sovereignty is an artificial construct, not something whose value is to be assumed as a first principle of normative analysis.”408
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International law continues to privilege state interests, but today it is for the sake of the state’s
constituents. It is for the extent to which states, ideally, promote their people’s realization of
fundamental values: self-determination, human dignity, the general welfare, personal autonomy, and so forth. In the postwar era, the rationale for necessity in the law of nations—the
natural right of states to preserve themselves— has not been mooted. But it has been modified.
North Korea, qua state, as represented by Kim Jong-un’s autocratic regime, merits no moral
weight in modern international law. North Korea’s people do. States continue to merit moral
weight only insofar as they act as
trustees for the people committed to their care. As trustees, they are supposed to operate
lawfully and in a way that is mindful that the peaceful and ordered world that is sought
in international law—a world in which violence is restrained or mitigated, a world in
which travel, trade, and cooperation are possible—is something sought not for the sake of
national sovereigns themselves but for the sake of the millions of men, women, communities, and businesses who are committed to their care.409
In the nineteenth century, Portugal could lawfully take the property of British nationals
residing in its territory, despite a treaty with Great Britain prohibiting this appropriation,
because of the “necessity of providing for the subsistence of certain contingents of troops
engaged in quelling internal disturbances.”410 Consistent with the law of the era, Herbert Jenner could reasonably and accurately advise the Crown that necessity constituted a defense
under the circumstances because “the strict observance of the Treaty would be altogether
incompatible with the paramount duty which a Nation owes to itself ”411—that is, self-preservation, which required Portugal to “us[e] those means, which may be absolutely and indispensably necessary to the safety, and even to the very existence of the State.”412
Today, if North Korea were to appropriate foreign aid for the use of its army, citing a comparable need to preserve its very existence in the face of, suppose, an effort to reunite the Koreas,
international law should condemn, not countenance, any such necessity plea. Similarly, in
1989, had East Germany invoked necessity, citing the imminent peril to its very existence,
surely its government, too, should not have been entitled to assert, on the basis of a necessity
plea, any right to prevent reunification in order to preserve East Germany’s very existence—
even if it did so without violating the human rights of its citizens or jus cogens norms.413
Of course, these examples are hyperbolic. But the point of emphasis is more modest: the
focus of any necessity plea in the contemporary law of state responsibility should be on
human beings as the fundamental unit of normative analysis, not on states as such or for their
own sake.
Second, even if contemporary international law distinguishes between the role and definition of necessity in general international law, on the one hand, and its role in fields governed
by special rules of international law, on the other, this distinction has not always been respected.
Especially in convoluted factual contexts, such as Argentina’s financial crisis, it will frequently
409
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be tempting to look beyond a lex specialis for textual guidance. Article 25 has a prima facie
appeal in this regard because of its formulaic character, generality, and abstraction. But because
one state’s safeguarded essential interest will often be another’s seriously impaired essential interest, a general principle enabling states to shift the loss under exigent circumstances (which
would almost invariably be subjectively determined by the invoking state, at least in the first
instance) may well be both an invitation to abuse and imprudent as international policy. One
alternative as a baseline for necessity—and one more consistent with state practice—would be
to allow suspension of an obligation but to require, as a default rule, ex post compensation at
the traditional level of restitutio in integrum,414 perhaps subject to mitigation, but necessarily
based on a standard that would not be subjective and self-judging.415
The ILC chose to define necessity in the negative—that is, in terms of the circumstances in
which necessity may not be invoked—as one of several drafting techniques to emphasize the
truly exceptional nature of the plea. Yet Article 25’s abstract, open-textured language, such as
“essential interest,” “seriously impair,” and “contributed to the situation,” still leaves much to
interpretation. Without further exposition, these phrases elide many of the most difficult questions that necessity raises in any legal system,416 and a fortiori in the international one. It may,
for example, be accurate to say, as to the first of these phrases, that the “extent to which a given
interest is ‘essential’ depends on all the circumstances, and cannot be prejudged.”417 But under
Article 25, ultimately a decision maker will need to make such a judgment and consider the
invoking state’s essential interest against another state’s (seriously impaired?) essential interest—a de facto choice-of-evils test, which, as I have tried to explain in this essay, is especially
problematic in international law. And notwithstanding the ILC’s painstaking effort to stress
the exceptional nature of necessity, recent state practice raises the prospect that (1) necessity
will be less exceptional, and raised more often, than its text suggests, and (2) its textual limits
will not be strictly construed, rendering Article 25 susceptible to protean interpretation and
application.
By contrast, necessity can be a viable and readily administrable defense within a self-contained regime of special rules and institutions, a lex specialis. Typically, this expression refers
to a treaty regime in which the parties, ex ante, codify and bind themselves to particular rules
that establish effective institutions and the requisite, but otherwise elusive, normative consensus. A lex specialis may also include an explicit definition of necessity that is designed to be sensitive to the relevant policy objectives in context. Under these circumstances, necessity can be
subjected to meaningful interpretation and regulation, and it can be an indispensable part of
particular legal regimes. The clearest example in contemporary international law is trade law
under the W TO/GATT regime. But that example need not be unique and may well guide the
design of future regimes.
In general international law, however, we return to the problem that necessity involves factual circumstances that call for normative judgments in areas of law vigorously contested by
414
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states; and in almost every case, the real question is who—which state, states, or other international actors—should bear the cost occasioned by a violation defended as necessary. Consider three general situations in which necessity has been, or might be, pleaded.
The first is familiar: a state, citing necessity, expropriates the property of foreigners. Applying Article 25, and assuming the absence of a BIT or comparable instrument, the essential
interest of the expropriating state (say, mitigating a severe economic crisis) might outweigh the
interest of the state toward which the relevant obligation exists (here, the obligation not
to deny justice to the latter’s nationals). But if Article 25 is without prejudice to the question of compensation, as Article 27 says,418 then Article 25’s definition of necessity adds little
to the analysis: customary international law, even in the absence of a BIT, requires payment
of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.
Necessity modifies the analysis only if we assume, as the LG&E panel did, that necessity shifts
the loss. Mindful that one state’s “safeguarded” essential interest will often be another’s “seriously impaired” essential interest, the real question is therefore whether necessity should require
foreign investors to bear the loss. Article 25 does not (and should not be revised to) answer this
question acontextually. Rather than allow necessity to obscure what is, in reality, a conflict of
state interests and values in a legal system without a clear normative hierarchy, we might candidly recognize the competing social interests and values at stake, and then seek a mutually
acceptable resolution through more transparent discourse and argument.419
Now consider a different, second scenario. Recently, hundreds of thousands of Somali
nationals sought shelter and food in Kenya, which, while offering assistance, indicated that it
could not absorb refugees indefinitely. A similar situation arose in 1995, when “50,000 Rwandan refugees and local Burundis fled to the border of Tanzania seeking safety.”420 Yet Tanzania,
which, just one year earlier, had absorbed some five hundred thousand refugees generated by
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, closed its border and refused these new refugees a safe haven—
arguably in violation of non-refoulement: “In effect, Tanzania had invoked the concept of ‘state
of necessity’ as an excuse for a border-closure that may have violated its duties under international law.”421 Should Tanzania be required by international law to open its borders under the
foregoing circumstances? Or should the plea of necessity have obviated what would otherwise
have been Tanzania’s international obligation to the refugees?
As a way to minimize human rights violations, Roman Boed suggests, as a rule, modifying
the Article 25 formulation so that the erga omnes interests of the “community of States” would
be privileged above a state’s essential interests.422 At first blush, Boed’s proposal sounds morally
appealing. But it is quixotic to suppose that a developing state like Tanzania, faced with the
prospect of providing for thousands upon thousands of refugees, will not, at some point, conclude that it cannot accommodate any more, and therefore close its borders—at least absent
financial and other assistance from the international community, in the interest of which Tanzania, according to the argument, should act. Once again, the point of emphasis is that the real
or ultimate question raised by necessity turns out to be in large part about who, or which state
418
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or states, should bear the cost. Even the most altruistic and wealthy state will at some point
privilege its own interests over the seriously impaired interests of another state or the international community as a whole.423
As a final example, imagine that global warming leads to rising sea levels, threatening to flood
heavily populated areas in one state, Ruritania, which shares a river with another, Azania. Ruritania, invoking necessity, diverts the waters in order to avoid about $4 million in damages to
the infrastructure of one of its major cities. But suppose that by so diverting the floodwaters,
it exacerbates flooding in Azania, the lower riparian state, and that, as a consequence, Azania
sustains infrastructure damages in the amount of $4 billion. Here again, it is difficult to imagine that Ruritania would refrain from diverting the waters even if, to paraphrase Article 25, the
serious impairment of Azania’s essential interests outweighs the grave and imminent peril to
Ruritania’s essential interests by a factor of one thousand. This example and the somewhat
crude utilitarian analysis may well be simplistic. But it suffices to clarify a basic point: that the
issue is which state, or to what extent each state, should bear the loss. The rubric of necessity,
along with its formulation in Article 25, tends to obscure this simple fact.
The upshot of these examples is not (necessarily) that necessity, as a general defense, has no
place in contemporary international law; it is that we need to be cautious about its codification
and consequences. Article 25, as written and construed in the ILC Commentary, precludes the
responsibility of the invoking state. It operates as a defense based on a structure that, in effect,
requires an analysis redolent of the choice-of-evils paradigm in national law. This paradigm
proves both incongruous and problematic in international law. It is also (apparently) inconsistent with the Articles on State Responsibility’s general perspective on CPWs. As suggested
above, one alternative would be to treat necessity, insofar as it states a default conduct rule, as
an excuse requiring compensation at the traditional level, restitutio in integrum, subject, however, to a decision rule allowing for equitable adjustment ex post. Treating it this way may well
encourage or facilitate more subtle, contextually sensitive judgments about the scope or validity
of the defense in diverse circumstances. I do not mean to propose this alternative blithely as
either sufficient in itself or obviously correct. I only mean to suggest that further reflection on
this issue, among others, is needed.
Because contemporary international law is not a unified and integrated system (it is commonplace today to describe it as “fragmented”),424 a strong qualification is in order before concluding: it would clearly be an error to suppose that necessity, as a word that appears in many
and diverse fields of international law, has the same meaning in each.425 The focus of this essay
has been on necessity in the law of state responsibility, and it is in that context that I have sought
to appraise the status, practical operation, value, and limits of Article 25. The analysis may or
may not have implications for other contexts.
Necessity in international law pertains, first and foremost, to states, the traditional and still
the principal subjects of international law. I doubt that this situation will change in the near
423
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future, and it is far from clear that we would welcome any such development.426 Nevertheless,
there can be no question that the advent of human rights law and the exponential growth of
new institutions, regimes, and processes have changed the particular conception of the state in
the classical law of nations—and with it the propriety of a necessity defense that traditionally
focused on the state qua state rather than on human beings. This and related changes compel sustained reflection before general international law adopts a defense authorizing
exceptions to international obligations in what is, already, a characteristically unstable legal
system.427
426
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